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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent research documents that voluntary disclosure—in particular, managerial 
forecast guidance—lowers uncertainty levels, as proxied by option implied 
variances.  In this study I explore the effect of such voluntary disclosure on other 
dimensions of uncertainty.  In particular, I investigate the effect of managerial 
guidance on the variance risk premium (VRP).  Prior research predicts and 
provides empirical evidence of the VRP, which reflects that implied variances 
(on average) exceed actual variances, and exists to compensate traders, who sell 
variance protection for equity options.  First, I confirm previous findings that 
implied variances are lower when firms issue management guidance.  Second 
and more importantly, I document that the VRP is higher when firms provide 
guidance.  I reconcile these seemingly contradictory results by (i) confirming that 
a significant portion of the increase in VRP is attributable to uncertainty specific 
to the impending earnings announcement, consistent with the primary role 
played by the voluntary management disclosure; and (ii) documenting that a 
viii 
higher moment of uncertainty—implied kurtosis levels (i.e., price jump risk)—is 
higher with managerial guidance.  Additional tests examining characteristics of 
managerial guidance reveal these findings are strongest for firms issuing 
sporadic guidance, guidance issued close to earnings announcements, and those 
exhibiting the largest surprise.  Overall, the evidence suggests that voluntary 
disclosure such as management guidance can reduce expected variance, but 
simultaneously increase higher order moments of uncertainty such as expected 
price jumps.  
ix 
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THE EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE ON UNCERTAINTY 
AROUND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A primary reason for the production of accounting information is to 
reduce investor uncertainty about firm valuations and future price outcomes.  
One channel for accounting-related information is voluntary disclosure.  
Assuming that voluntary disclosure has information content, models such as 
Verrecchia (1983) and Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that such disclosures 
reduce uncertainty about the value of firms’ assets.  Empirically, prior research 
finds that uncertainty, using option-implied variances as a proxy, is lower when 
firms issue a commonly-examined type of voluntary disclosure, management 
earnings guidance (e.g., Billings et al. 2015).  Due to the lower variance, guidance 
can lower the earnings announcement premia in stocks (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007). 
However, though much of the literature associates investor uncertainty 
with future return or price variance, traders are exposed to other forms of 
uncertainty.  For example, investors may be concerned about unforeseen shifts in 
future volatility.  If investors are sensitive to volatility or variance risk, they will 
accordingly seek contracts and positions that reduce their exposure to high 
volatility states.  Similarly, investors may be averse to price crashes and jumps 
(Scott and Horvath 1980) and thus desire contracts that pay off in extreme states.  
Consequently, this study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure—
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specifically managerial guidance—on the cost to hedge against unknown 
variance and rare price events: the variance risk premium (VRP). 
Even though options provide forward estimates of variance, prior 
research shows that option implied variances are biased; that is, that the ex ante 
expected variance reflected in option-implied variances is systematically larger 
(on average) than the ex post realized variance reflected in actual stock price 
volatility (e.g., Coval and Shumway 2001; Bakshi and Kapadia 2003; Han and 
Zhou 2012).  This positive bias is commonly called the VRP, reflecting the belief 
that traders require compensation to sell variance protection.  The existence of 
the VRP is supported in theoretical models such as Epstein and Ji (2013), which 
suggest that the uncertainty about future variance realizations causes investors to 
overvalue options compared to subsequent realized variance.  Thus, these 
models show the VRP to be the cost of selling the risk of uncertain or unknown 
future variance.  Of note, this risk differs from that an equity investor faces 
because (i) a seller of options is concerned about the range of future variance as 
opposed to expected or even maximum future variance, and (ii) option traders 
are more sensitive to rare asset price and volatility jumps compared to equity 
traders (Broadie et al. 2007; Barth and So 2014).  In short, the VRP is 
compensation to traders that are willing to provide insurance to other investors 
against high volatility states and extreme price movements. 
Prior research (Billings et al. 2015) documents that implied variances are 
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lower for firms issuing management forecast guidance, a primary form of 
voluntary disclosure.  I build on these findings by developing and testing 
expectations of the effect of management guidance on the VRP around earnings 
announcements.  One the one hand, additional guidance may lower the VRP, as 
the additional information should allow option sellers to price the contracts with 
lower insurance premia.  In addition, voluntary disclosure can reduce private 
information among investors.  If informed investors take long positions in 
options to take advantage of the implicit leverage in the contracts, then the 
reduction in information asymmetries should result in lower options prices 
relative to subsequent realized variance.  On the other hand, managerial 
guidance may increase the VRP around earnings announcement dates even if, on 
average, it lowers implied variances.  In particular, the issuance of such 
voluntary disclosure is an endogenous event and option traders may become 
more uncertain about future variance outcomes (i.e., the “variance of variance”) 
and/or assume that guidance is signaling the rise in low-probability extreme 
announcements (Kothari et al. 2009; Hamm et al. 2014).  
Using model-free implied variances, I first document (consistent with 
prior research) that implied variances are lower before quarterly earnings 
announcements when firms provide earnings guidance in the prior quarter.  
More importantly, I then document that the VRP (i.e., the spread between 
subsequent realized variance and implied variances) around earnings 
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announcements is higher when firms provide guidance.  I confirm these findings: 
(i) using alternative VRP maturities of 30-, 60-, and 91-days; (ii) alternative 
measures of the dependent variable (i.e., Black-Scholes versus model-free 
implied volatilities; percentage change in VRP); (iii) excluding observations 
likely subject to high macro volatility (e.g., those coinciding with the global 
financial crisis); and (iv) using alternative specifications to better control for 
outliers in the data (e.g., rank regression).  Overall, these results are consistent 
with option traders requiring extra compensation when they sell options when 
firms issue management guidance.   
I then conduct three sets of analyses to provide further insights.  First, I 
directly link the issuance of the voluntary disclosure to uncertainty specific to the 
impending earnings announcement.  That is, management earnings forecasts 
should address uncertainty regarding this upcoming event; I confirm that the 
primary source of uncertainty during the examined option maturity (i.e., 30-
days) does, indeed, relate to that focused on the days surrounding the upcoming 
earnings announcements.  Second, I examine the effect of management guidance 
on higher moments of uncertainty: implied skewness (price crash risk) and 
implied kurtosis (price jump risk).  I fail to find evidence that management 
guidance is significantly associated with implied skewness, but do find 
consistent evidence that it is positively associated with implied kurtosis.  This 
provides a reconciliation of the current results to prior findings: that is, while 
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management forecast guidance appears to reduce the expected variance 
surrounding the impending earnings announcement (reflected in lower implied 
variances as documented in prior literature), it also appears to simultaneously 
increase the expected price jump risk (reflected in higher kurtosis).  The net effect 
of these two dimensions of uncertainty leads to the observed increase in VRP.  
Finally, I examine cross-sectional characteristics of management forecasts I 
predict as incrementally affecting the observed increase in VRP.  As expected, I 
find that the higher VRP is most pronounced when firms issue forecasts having 
attributes likely reflective of increased uncertainty: firms issuing sporadic 
guidance, guidance having larger surprise relative to expectations, and guidance 
issued closer to the earnings announcement date.   
This study makes three central contributions.  First, by assessing the effect 
of voluntary disclosure on the cost of insuring against variance changes and asset 
jumps, this study complements prior research investigating the effect of 
voluntary disclosure on stock returns around earnings announcements (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2007).  Second, it builds upon prior research examining accounting 
information effects on VRPs (Barth and So 2014) by providing evidence 
consistent with higher VRPs when firms issue management forecasts.1  Third, it 
                                                           
1  As a clarification, the dependent variable ExVOL in Barth and So (2014) is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of realized returns to implied volatilities over quarters 
t to t + 9.  Thus, the use of a long horizon makes it difficult to identify the effect 
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demonstrates the need to consider and assess investor uncertainty not just in 
terms of variance, but also in terms of its higher order moments.  Thus, it builds 
upon prior studies using implied volatilities/variances and their changes as 
proxies for changes in uncertainty (e.g., Rogers et al. 2009; Billings et al. 2015) by 
showing that accounting information—including voluntary disclosure such as 
management forecasts—can have differing effects on higher moments of 
uncertainty.   
 Section 2 presents the prior literature and hypothesis development.  
Section 3 describes the research design, and Section 4 the sample selection 
process.  Section 5 provides the main empirical results; key robustness tests; 
analyses centered on the earnings announcement date effect; and analyses of 
higher moments of uncertainty (skewness and kurtosis).  Section 6 presents 
analyses examining characteristics of management forecasts.  Section 7 
concludes.     
2. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This study assesses the effect of voluntary disclosure on higher moments 
of uncertainty.  Prior accounting research focuses primarily on the role of 
disclosure in affecting implied volatilities (e.g., Rogers et al. 2009; Billings et al. 
2015) and the effect on crash risk (e.g., Hamm et al. 2014).  I build upon these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
guidance on the next (i.e., upcoming) quarter VRP as compared to the next nine 
quarters.    
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prior papers by focusing on the variance risk premium (or VRP) and other 
aspects of uncertainty. 
Understanding the VRP requires a review of early models of options 
prices.  Critically, such models (particularly the well-known Black and Scholes 
1973) assume that future volatility is both constant and known by traders.  Because 
the other model parameters are readily available, the price of options can thus be 
easily calculated under these models once a variance value is established.  Using 
these assumptions, Black and Scholes (1973) shows that, in contrast to equity 
prices, option prices should not incorporate investor risk preferences. 
Curiously, the Black-Scholes model therefore implies that options (and 
other derivatives) are redundant instruments, as option positions can be 
replicated by dynamic trading strategies.  However, the equity options market is 
large and active: for example, in 2011 over 18 million options contracts were 
traded on equity or equity indices daily in the US.2  This strongly suggests that 
options play a unique role in investors’ trading and risk management strategies.  
One key reason for the large trading of equity options is that—in contrast to the 
assumptions of Black and Scholes-type models—investors are unlikely to know 
the level of volatility with certainty; that is, volatility is stochastic (Poon and 
                                                           
2  See the Options Clearing Corporation’s volume query: 
http://www.optionsclearing.com/webapps/historical-volume-query. 
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Granger 2003).  Thus, options provide opportunities to hedge against (and bet 
on) volatility movements and large price movements. 
Critically, once stochastic volatility and asset jumps are introduced into 
valuation models, then investor preferences and risk aversions are relevant for 
option prices and risk neutral valuation techniques require modification (e.g., 
Heston 1993).  This modification generates a risk premium in options, suggesting 
that option implied variances comprise two parts: (i) the expected variance over 
the life of the option; and (ii) a cost to providing variance insurance (i.e., VRP).  
Regarding the latter component, newer theoretical models suggest that implied 
variances will exceed subsequent realized variances; that is, traders, on average, 
will profit from selling variance protection.  In particular, Epstein and Ji (2013) 
shows that when traders are ambiguous about future variance in a modified 
Consumption-CAPM model option, implied variances will exceed future 
variance.  This model suggests that the level of variance does not generate the 
VRP, per se; rather, the VRP is generated when traders are unsure about the level 
of future realized variance, with the VRP increasing as the range of possible 
future variance widens.3  
Empirical studies confirm the existence of a positive VRP (Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes 1993; Carr and Wu 2009; Han and Zhou 2012).  However, research 
                                                           
3  For example, a firm with a known future volatility of 3 percent per day has an 
expected VRP of zero under Black-Scholes; but a firm with a volatility known only to 
exist in the range of 1 percent to 2 percent per day has a positive expected VRP.  
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attempting to delineate the causes of the VRP is inconclusive.  Carr and Wu 
(2009) finds that traditional asset pricing risk factors (i.e., beta, size, book-to-
market, momentum, variance levels) fail to explain the VRP.  If VRPs from equity 
options remain largely unexplained by traditional risk factors, this suggests a 
possible role for the information environment to explain the cross-section of 
VRPs.  Han and Zhou (2012) hints at this possibility, finding that VRPs are lower 
for firms’ with lower analyst disagreement. 
For studies examining the effect of information on uncertainty using 
option implied variances, it is possible that disclosure affects both the expected 
variance and the VRP.  For example, Billings et al. (2015) documents that implied 
volatilities decrease when management bundles guidance with an earnings 
announcement.  Of note, this latter result can reflect that the voluntary disclosure 
of the management guidance reduces (i) the expected asset variance, (ii) the VRP 
built in implied variances, or (iii) both.  Distinguishing between these possible 
interpretations is important to understand the mechanisms by which voluntary 
disclosures such as managerial guidance can affect investor perceptions of 
uncertainty.  Of note, theory suggests that the different components of 
uncertainty need not move in sync (Epstein and Ji 2013).   
 Accordingly, I develop the following two-sided expectation regarding the 
effect of voluntary disclosure—as proxied via managerial guidance—on the VRP.  
First, the provision of managerial guidance can lead to a reduced VRP.  A 
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primary reason cited for managerial guidance is to decrease share volatility and 
investor uncertainty.  For example, Lambert et al. (2007) shows that any 
additional disclosure having informational content reduces investor uncertainty.4   
While the model of Epstein and Ji (2013) suggests that the VRP is based on the 
range of possible future variance and not its level, the two constructs can be 
positively related.  That is, the information in managerial guidance may not only 
lower the level of expected variance (as demonstrated in prior research), but also 
reduce the range of possible future variance; this would lead to a predicted 
negative association between managerial guidance and the VRP.  Additionally, 
guidance can reduce information asymmetries (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991; Coller and Yohn 1997).  Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that 
investors with private information are likely to take positions in options rather 
than equities (e.g., Easely et al. 1998; Bali and Hovakimian 2009; Jin et al. 2012).  
If informed traders prefer to take long options positions compared to short 
option positions then a reduction of private information will also lower 
premiums in options that were in place to protect sellers of options from 
incurring consistent losses.5 
                                                           
4    See Section 3.1. 
5  While not an example of true private information, a trader recently reaped a large 
profit by purchasing out-of-the-money call options written on a firm that was 
rumored to be an acquisition target.  The trader reacted quickly to a social media 
message, and was able to turn an investment of $300,000 into $2.4 million dollars 
within minutes; see http://nypost.com/2015/04/02/wall-street-trader-makes-2-4m-
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 However, even if managerial guidance lowers the overall level of implied 
volatilities, this does not imply that the VRP will also decline.  First, the use of 
guidance is endogenous, and option sellers may worry what the issuance of 
guidance signals for future stock outcomes, even if all market participants agree 
that information has been provided to the market.  For example, prior research 
(e.g., Fuller and Jensen 2002) argues that managers use guidance to manipulate 
analysts’ forecasts; accordingly, sellers of options may exhibit concerns about 
managers’ incentives for providing guidance (Rogers and Stocken 2005).  Such 
concerns can be exacerbated for firms lacking a history of providing guidance.  
Second, managers may face incentives to withhold bad news but accelerate the 
release of good news to the market (Kothari et al. 2009). If managers potentially 
withhold bad news to later dates but provide good news with guidance, then the 
option market may interpret guidance as a noisy signal of yet-to-be revelations of 
bad news.  Thus, guidance will cause traders to price both a low probability, high 
variance regime and a high likelihood, low variance regime where guidance 
provides information about the upcoming announcement.  Combined, this can 
lead to a situation where expected variance is lower but traders’ view about the 
potential range of future variance over the earnings announcement period is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
thanks-to-a-tweet.  Also see the example provided by Pan and Poteshman (2006) in 
their footnote 1.    
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simultaneously higher along with an increased ex ante probability of a price jump 
which generates an increase in the VRP.6 
Because managerial forecast guidance can either increase or decrease the 
VRP, I express the main hypothesis in null form: 
H1:  Managerial guidance is not associated with the variance risk premium 
(VRP) around earnings announcements. 
 
Figure 1 presents this two-tailed prediction, assuming (based on the 
findings of prior literature) that the managerial earnings forecasts reduce implied 
variances around its earnings announcements.  The first bar represents the 
situation, where there is no forecast; the second bar represents the situation 
where a forecast is issued, and both the implied variance and the VRP are lower; 
and the third bar represents the situation where a forecast is issued and the VRP 
is higher even with a reduced implied variance.  Thus, my empirical tests 
attempt to distinguish between the second and third bars in this figure. 
<See Figure 1> 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 To investigate the effect of managerial forecasts on the VRP, I use the 
following empirical model: 
VRP_Xit = β1MNGFORECASTit + β2LOG_VIXt + β3FIRM_AGEit + β4ROEit  
                                                           
6    It is also possible that voluntary disclosure will increase information asymmetries.  
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that disclosures may increase the level of private 
information between traders, who are differentially able to process the new 
information.  
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 + β5LOSSit + β6SIZEit + β7LEVit + β8LOG_BTMit + β9LOG_FOLLit  
 + β10LOG_HISTVOLit + Firm and Quarterly Fixed Effects + εit            (1) 
 The dependent variable is VRP_X, alternatively defined as VRP_30, 
VRP_60 and VRP_91, which correspond to 30-, 60-, and 91-day VRPs.  I first 
calculate the model-free implied variances for each stock (see Appendix 2).7  I use 
model-free implied variances, versus the more commonly-applied Black-Scholes 
ATM implied variances, for two primary reasons.  First, model-free implied 
variances incorporate all option strikes for a single options maturity (Jiang and 
Tian 2005; Carr and Wu 2009; Neururer et al. 2015).  Second, they are robust to 
different option modeling assumptions, such as price jumps and stochastic 
volatility; as such, these variances can extract market information that the Black-
Scholes ATM implied variances fail to incorporate (Zhang et al. 2012).  Despite 
the theoretical superiority of model-free implied variance, I later confirm the 
robustness of the results to using Black-Scholes implied variances.    
 Following prior research (Carr and Wu 2009; Driessen et al. 2009), I define 
the variance risk premium as the difference between (i) the expected or implied 
variance (denoted ImpVar), and (ii) the realized variance (denoted RealizedVar).  
To calculate ImpVar, I convert the 30- (60-) [91-] day implied annualized 
                                                           
7  Prior research using model-free implied variances includes Neururer et al. (2016) and 
Sridharan (2015). 
 14 
variances into their implied daily variances.8, 9  To calculate RealizedVar, I use 
firm i’s daily realized variance of its stock returns for each interval by using the 
respective 30, 60, or 91 calendar days starting at day –2 prior to the earnings 
announcement date 0 for quarter t.  My use of a mixture of trading and calendar 
days to derive ImpVar and RealizedVar follows the maturities stated in option 
contracts, which are based on calendar days.  The realized returns are the CRSP 
total returns adjusted for dividends and splits.10  As my final step, I define the 
VRP as the difference between the maturity-matched implied variance and the 
realized variance.  Using VRP_30 to illustrate, the dependent variable is: 
VRP_30it = ImpVar_30it – RealizedVar_30it                                                        (2) 
Here, ImpVar_30 is the implied variance and RealizedVar_30 is the subsequent 
realized variance, both measured over 30 calendar days.  Similar calculations are 
performed to derive VRP_60 and VRP_91.  Thus, because I use model-free 
implied variances, the VRP approximates the premium investors are willing to 
pay for volatility insurance. 
 The experimental variable is MNGFORECAST.  I identify those firms 
providing management forecasts (per First Call), if issued over the look-back 
                                                           
8    The calculated variances per OptionMetrics are annualized, so I divided by 252 
(approximately the number of trading days in a year) to convert to daily variances. 
9  The implied variances are calculated using the average of the implied variances from 
trading days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings announcement.  Results are unchanged 
to alternatively using the implied variances from day –5, –4, or –3. 
10  Note that returns are not market-adjusted, as the options market predicts total asset 
variance and not excess or idiosyncratic variance. 
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interval beginning –5 trading days before the earnings announcement date for 
quarter t – 1 through –6 trading days before the earnings announcement date for 
quarter t.  This interval should incorporate any bundled guidance from the 
previous earnings announcement, and also allow sufficient time for the market to 
incorporate the information into option prices.  Figure 2 presents a timeline for 
the measurement of both the dependent and experimental variables.  
MNGFORECAST is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm provides any 
earnings guidance during the above look-back interval.  Following Equation (1), 
the test of H1 is whether β1 is significantly different from zero.  
<See Figure 2> 
 I include a number of control variables, following Rogers et al. (2009) and 
Han and Zhou (2012).  Rogers et al. (2009) investigates the role of management 
forecasts on option prices; thus their setting is similar to mine.  In addition, Han 
and Zhou (2012) investigates factors predicting the VRP in individual stocks.  
The control variables include the following: 
LOG_VIXt   the log of the mean value of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) 
from trading days (–5, –3); the predicted sign is positive, as 
VRPs should rise when market volatility levels are higher;11 
                                                           
11  The use of logs for VIX and historical volatility means that the choice of variances or 
volatilities does not affect the research design.  Nonetheless, results are unchanged to 
using the unlogged form of these variables. 
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FIRM_AGEit   the square root of firm i’s age at year t in years, using the 
firm’s first instance in the Compustat quarterly database; the 
predicted sign is negative as additional signals allow traders 
to learn about a firm’s reporting style, thus lowering the 
required premium; 
ROEit   firm i’s income before extraordinary items divided by the 
book value of equity per share from quarter t–1; the predicted 
sign is negative as better performance should lead to 
perceived lower firm risk, and thus a lower premium; 
LOSSit   an indicator variable equal to one if ROE for firm i for quarter 
t is less than zero, and zero otherwise; the predicted sign is 
positive, as loss firms have higher risk and bankruptcy 
probabilities; 
SIZEit   the natural log of firm i’s total assets (in $ millions) at quarter 
t–1; the predicted sign is negative due to more stable 
operations and better access to credit markets; 
LEVit   the ratio of firm i’s total liabilities to total assets at quarter t–1; 
the predicted sign is positive, as more leveraged firms have 
higher risk; 
LOG_BTMit   the natural log of book-to-market ratio for firm i, where total 
book common equity value is from quarter t–1 and equity 
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value is at day t–3 to the earnings date for quarter t; the 
predicted sign is positive, as lower BTM signals poor firm 
prospects; 
LOG_FOLLit  the natural log of the number of EPS forecasts for firm i for 
quarter t per IBES; the predicted sign is negative, as firms with 
higher following have richer information environments, and 
thus lower risk; and 
LOG_HISTVOLit  the natural log of firm i’s realized daily volatility over the 
period (–94, –3) preceding the earnings announcement day 0 
for quarter t; the predicted sign is positive, as greater equity 
volatility should increase the VRP. 
 Finally, the primary tests include both firm and quarterly fixed effects to 
mitigate potential omitted variables.12  Regressions are estimated using OLS, 
standard errors are clustered by firm, and all continuous dependent and 
independent variables except LOG_VIX are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to control for outliers.  For readability all continuous independent 
                                                           
12  The estimated Adj. R’s (Akaike Information Criterion corrected for finite samples) 
values are higher (lower) when using firm fixed effects compared to using industry 
fixed effects (or not using any fixed effects); this provides some support for the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects in the regression models. 
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variables are standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance, and all 
regression coefficients are multiplied by 10,000 to facilitate interpretation.13 
4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 1 Panel A provides the sample selection process.  I first obtain all 
IBES quarterly earnings reports over 2000–2011, where the year is based on the 
earnings announcement date.  This ensures that all firm-quarters have some 
analyst coverage; my sample period ends at 2011 due to my available options 
data.  Firm quarters are eliminated due to: lack of match with Compustat (N = 
27,376); lack of match with CRSP (15,270); non-positive book assets (257); non-
positive stockholders’ equity (3,671); inability to calculate historical or forward 
volatility (1,847); missing implied volatilities (55,813); or the difference between 
the earnings announcement dates for quarter t–1 versus quarter t being either too 
small or too large (4,295).14  The final sample has 81,824 observations 
                                                           
13  I standardize the continuous variables to generate estimated regression coefficients 
that are roughly on the same scale.  Standardization does not affect variable 
significance or regression fits. 
14  Specifically, I delete observations for which the earnings announcement date (from 
IBES) for quarter t is either less than 60 calendar days or greater than 120 calendar 
days after the announcement date for quarter t-1 (field RDQ from Compustat).  I do 
this to remove any reports reasonably viewed as extremely late; thus, my sample 
should include only those reports reflecting a somewhat consistent quarterly cycle.  
Note that some firms consistently take extra time to announce their fourth quarter 
earnings compared to other quarters; this creates a pattern where their fourth quarter 
earnings announcements appear delayed and the immediately following first fiscal 
quarter announcement appears to be released early when compared to the median 
interval of 91 days.  Such observations are not necessarily due to delayed reports.  
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representing 4,391 unique firms.  Table 1 Panel B shows the number of 
observations by economic sector; the number of observations is skewed toward 
the manufacturing (43%) and services (17%) sectors.  
<See Table 1, Panel A> 
<See Table 1, Panel B> 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for managerial guidance.  Panel A 
presents firm-quarter observations having either quarterly or annual guidance 
during the specified look-back period (again defined as the interval from –5 
trading days before the quarter t – 1 earnings announcement to –6 trading before 
the quarter t earnings announcement).15  Additionally, untabulated results show 
that approximately 60% of all sample firms provide quarterly or annual guidance 
at some point during the sample period.  Panel B of Table 2 displays the annual 
distributions of forecasts.  The increase in observations over the sample period 
generally reflects the increased number of firms having options trading on their 
stocks.  Consistent with Johnson (2009), there is a reduction the percentage of 
firms providing guidance in the later sample years.  Note that a large increase in 
forecasts occurs from 2000 to 2001: this is consistent with prior research (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, the 60- and 120-day cut-offs attempt to balance these two issues.  Nonetheless, 
the main results are unaffected by inclusion of these observations. 
15  The mean of MNGFORECAST (i.e., the percentage of earnings announcements 
preceded by either annual or quarterly guidance) is 42.5% (untabulated). 
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Anilowski et al. 2007; see their Figure 1), and likely reflects increased 
management forecasts due to Regulation FD (Heflin et al. 2003).   
<See Table 2, Panel A> 
<See Table 2, Panel B> 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the primary independent and 
dependent variables; all continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  Consistent with prior literature, the mean and medians of VRP_30, 
and VRP_60, VRP_91 are all positive suggesting that, on average, investors are 
willing to pay to gain the protection offered by options.  In addition, the median 
value of LOG_VIX (LOG_HISTVOL) reveals that the average annual market 
volatility (average daily historical equity volatility) for the sample is 20.5% 
(2.5%).  The data further reveals the sample firms to be profitable, with mean 
(median) quarterly ROE of 1.7% (2.7%), and only 22% reporting a loss in the 
previous quarter.  Consistent with options being listed on larger firms, median 
sample firm assets is $1.52 billion, and the median age is 15 years.16  In addition, 
LOG_BTM reveals most firms’ equity values exceed their book values, and the 
median number of analysts issuing EPS forecasts (LOG_FOLL) is eight.  Finally, 
average firm leverage is 50% in the sample, though leverage varies greatly by 
industry (untabulated). 
                                                           
16  FIRM_AGE may be biased downwards due to some firms existing before the first 
available data in the Compustat. 
 21 
<See Table 3> 
To examine the VRP over the sample, Figure 3 presents a plot of quarterly 
fixed effects (i.e., binary variables) regressed onto VRP_30, VRP_60, and VRP_91 
without any additional controls (after multiplying the coefficients by 10,000).  On 
average, the VRP is positive; however, each time series exhibits high variance, 
negative skew, and excess kurtosis.  As expected, the lowest returns to selling 
volatility occur in the second half of 2008; that is, traders selling options in the 
weeks prior to the stock market crash of 2008 suffered large loses.  Additionally, 
the highest returns are associated with the first half of 2009, when the stock 
market recovered and realized volatilities moved down towards longer-term 
averages. 
<See Figure 3> 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Primary Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the primary regression results.  Panel A displays the 
results when using implied variance (ImpVar_30) as the dependent variable.  
Column (1) shows, consistent with Billings et al. (2015), that implied variance is 
lower before an earnings announcement for firms providing management 
forecasts (coefficient on MNGFORECAST = –0.882; t-stat = 5.48).  This negative 
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relationship is also found when including all the control variables.  Column (2) 
uses industry fixed effects (defined using two-digit SIC codes) and the resulting 
coefficient is negative and significant (t-stat = 5.50).  Similarly, Column (3) shows 
the results when using firm fixed effects; the coefficient on MNGFORECAST is 
again negative and significant (t-stat = 3.20).  Finally, Column (4) replaces 
implied variance with its natural log to account for a potential non-linear 
relationship between variance and the independent variable.  This change 
however does not affect the negative relationship between implied variance 
levels and management forecasts.     
<See Table 4, Panel A> 
Panel B displays the results when using the variance risk premium as the 
dependent variable.  Critically, Column (1) then reveals that the 30-day VRP 
(VRP_30) increases for firms issuing recent management forecast guidance 
(coefficient on MNGFORECAST = 0.803; t-stat = 5.34).  Combined, the regressions 
from Panel A and Panel B suggest that the option market recognizes information 
about the earnings announcement released with firm guidance, while the 
increase in the spread between implied and realized variances (i.e., the higher 
VRP) indicates that option traders require extra compensation (on average) when 
firms issue guidance. 
<See Table 4, Panel B> 
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Columns (2) and (3) add the control variables, maintaining VRP_30 as the 
dependent variable.  Again, the coefficient on MNGFORECAST is significantly 
positive with industry fixed effects (0.277; t-stat = 2.59) and firm fixed effects 
(0.864; t-stat = 5.73).  This suggests firms that issue a management forecast 
exhibit a higher VRP after controlling for other firm factors.  Columns (4) and (5) 
then present results for VRPs having option maturities of 60 and 91 days, 
respectively.  The results are unchanged: the estimated coefficients for 
MNGFORECAST are again significantly positive (for VRP_60, 0.598 with t-stat = 
4.76; for VRP_91, 0.525 with t-stat = 4.14).  All results suggest the options market 
adds to the risk premium embedded in option prices when firms provide 
guidance compared to when they do not conditional on firms’ fundamentals and 
their guidance history.17 
The control variables generally attain the predicted signs, though only 
several variables are significant.  Focusing on Panel B Column (3), and consistent 
with Han and Zhou (2012), VRPs are higher during times of market stress 
(coefficient on LOG_VIX = 1.948; t-stat = 10.15), lower for firms with high 
following (LOG_FOLL = –0.530; t-stat = 4.23), and higher for firms with high 
historical volatility (LOG_HISTVOL = 0.425; t-stat = 3.75).  The coefficients on 
performance (ROE), under-performance (LOSS), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), 
                                                           
17  The tenor of the results for Columns (3) – (5) is unchanged to (i) also interacting 
MNGFORECAST with all of the control variables and (ii) clustering standard errors 
by firm and quarter. 
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and book-to-market (LOG_BTM) are insignificant.  Note that the regressions 
using the longer horizon VRPs (VRP_60 and VRP_91) further reveal significantly 
negative, positive, and positive coefficients as expected for SIZE, LEV, and 
LOG_BTM, respectively.  Finally, the coefficient on FIRM_AGE attains an 
unexpected positive sign.   
5.2 Robustness Tests 
I next assess the robustness of the main results.  First, I re-estimate the 
regressions using Black-Scholes ATM implied variances as the measure of 
forward variance (dependent variables of BS_VRP_30, BS_VRP_60, and 
BS_VRP_91).  Panel A of Table 5, Column (1) reveals the coefficient on 
MNGFORECAST remains significantly positive (0.852; t-stat = 5.85); Columns (2) 
and (3) show the results are unchanged to using 60- and 91-day Black-Scholes 
implied variances.  Thus, the positive association between the issuance of a 
management forecast and the VRP does not appear driven by the choice of 
modeling (either model-free or Black-Scholes) for the implied variance 
calculation. 
<See Table 5, Panel A> 
Second, following prior research on implied volatilities (Carr and Wu 
2009) I re-estimate the regressions using the log ratio of the implied daily 
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variance to the subsequent realized daily variance as the dependent variable.18  
The construction approximates the percent change in the VRP associated with 
managerial guidance (dependent variables of %_VRP_30, %_VRP_60, and 
%_VRP_91).  Panel A of Table 5 again reveals that the coefficient on 
MNGFORECAST is positive and significantly related to the alternative 
dependent variable of the percent VRP.  Column (1) shows an estimated percent 
change in the 30-day variance premium of 4.86% (coefficient = 4.863; t-stat = 
6.04).  Columns (1) and (2) also indicate the results hold when VRP_60 and 
VRP_91 are converted into their percent forms.  
<See Table 5, Panel B> 
Third, I assess the robustness of the main results to removal of certain 
observations (Panel B of Table 5).  I delete all observations from 2000, during 
which the number of managerial forecasts is low (see Table 2); the results of 
Column (1) show that results are unchanged by the removal of these 
observations.  The results are also unchanged to deleting all observations from 
2001 (Column (2)), due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 causing US exchanges to 
close for an extended period (which can cause concerns with the calculation of 
realized variances). Finally, I delete all observations exhibiting high macro-
                                                           
18  Note that the use of the log ratio makes the choice between modeling the risk 
premiums in variances or volatilities irrelevant.  This is because the log ratio of the 
variance is always two times the log ratio of the volatilities, and, thus, the estimated 
regression coefficients will have the same t-statistics. 
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volatility coinciding with the global financial crisis, defined as 2008Q3 through 
2009Q2 (N = 7,931 deleted observations).  Column (3) of Panel C presents results 
that are unchanged: the coefficient on MNGFORECAST remains significantly 
positive (0.722; t-stat = 5.22).  In addition, in untabulated tests I exclude firms 
that have never issued management forecasts, as such firms may differ 
fundamentally from firms that do (N = 19,006 deleted observations); 
MNGFORECAST remains positive and significant in the regressions.   
<See Table 5, Panel C> 
I next estimate alternative tests to better control for outliers and to address 
potential reverse causation.  Regarding outliers, I convert VRP_30 into percentile 
ranks (multiplied by 100), with the ranking done by quarter (dependent variable 
of pRank(VRP_30), pRank(VRP_60), and pRank(VRP_91)).  The ranking should 
control for outliers beyond my use of winsorization in the primary analyses.  
Table 5, Panel D reveals the coefficient on MNGFORECAST remains significant 
and positive for each VRP interval, suggesting outliers are not driving the main 
findings.19  Next, I conduct analysis to rule out reverse causation: that is, that 
higher (expected) VRPs by managers can lead to the issuance of management 
                                                           
19  I also estimate robust regression.  I first adjust the data by subtracting out intra-firm 
medians from the dependent and independent variables (Bramati and Croux 2007).  
Then, using the adjusted data, I fit the regression models with M-regression including 
quarterly fixed effects (e.g., Leone et al. 2014) using iterated re-weighted least squares 
and the Huber bisquare proposal.  When using robust regression, I do not winsorize 
any variables.  The estimated coefficient on MNGFORECAST remains significantly 
positive across all VRP horizons. 
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forecasts to reduce such measures of market uncertainty.  I remove any 
management forecasts provided 30 calendar days or less prior to the earnings 
announcement date: such forecasts are more likely to reflect management 
concerns of high uncertainty, and thus taking short-term actions (such as the 
issuance of management forecasts) to alleviate this uncertainty.  Results are 
unaffected when I remove these shorter-term forecasts from the sample 
(untabulated).   
<See Table 5, Panel D> 
Finally, I test to ensure the results are robust (individually or collectively) 
the following additional explanatory variables: the level of implied volatility to 
control for forward uncertainty (ImpVar_30); the percentage bid-offer spread to 
control for asset liquidity (%BID_ASK); the buy-and-hold excess return for the 
stock over the last quarter (EXCESS_RET91, using the CRSP value-weighted 
index to proxy for the market return) to control for recent firm performance; and 
analyst dispersion (DISP, defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ next 
quarter EPS forecasts divided by the mean EPS forecast, using a minimum of five 
analyst EPS forecasts).  Panel E of Table 5 shows the positive association between 
MNGFORECAST and VRP_30 holds with all the additional control variables.      
5.3 Earnings Date Variance Risk Premium 
My proxy for voluntary disclosure is whether a firm issues a management 
earnings forecast.  Critically, this assumes that this disclosure addresses investor 
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uncertainty regarding the impending quarterly earnings announcement.  
Accordingly, I next confirm that the uncertainty I measure with my VRP 
construct does primarily relate to that surrounding the impending earnings 
announcement.   
I first set σ30 and σ60 equal to the annualized model-free implied 
volatilities for thirty and sixty days, respectively.  Next, I assume that the only 
“abnormal” volatility event due within the next sixty days is the earnings 
announcement and that, for all other days over the next sixty days, the expected 
volatility is uniform and less than the earnings date variance.  Under these 
assumptions, σ30 > σ60.  I then calculate the implied forward variance of the stock 
(i.e., the annualized variance from day 31 to day 60) as:20 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 260 3060 365 30 365 30 365FWDσ σ σ = × − ×                                                                (3) 
Using the implied volatilities, the forward volatility, and the assumption 
that all the expected daily volatilities are the same except on the event (earnings) 
date, the implied variance for the event date is: 
( ) ( )2 22 3030 365 29 365EVENT FWDσ σ σ   = × − ×                                                              (4) 
 After computing the implied forward and event volatilities and removing 
any observations having a negative forward or event volatility, the data set 
reduces to 61,226 observations.  As a second calculation, I alternatively use the 
                                                           
20  This calculation is similar to that in Barth and So (2014). 
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Black-Scholes implied volatilities to estimate the implied earnings date variances, 
where the thirty- and sixty-day volatilities are set to the appropriate at-the-
money volatilities (N = 71,748).21  
 Next, I construct two proxies for the VRP around the earnings date using 
both the model-free and Black-Scholes implied earnings date variances.  I first 
define VRPE_INT as 2
EVENTσ minus the squared stock return from the interval of –
1 to +1 trading days around the earnings date.  I also define VRPE_MAXVLM as 
2
EVENTσ  minus the squared stock return for the date with the highest trading volume 
for the –1 to +1 trading days around the earnings date; thus, VRPE_MAXVLM 
attempts to find the date having the maximum amount of information released 
to the market using trading volume as the signal of new information (e.g., Kim 
and Verrecchia 1991).  Both VRPE_INT and VRPE_MAXVLM capture the amount 
of the VRP attributable to the earnings announcement date; they proxy for the 
amount of the options market overpriced or overestimated earnings variance 
compared to the actual realized variance for the earnings date. 
 Table 6 presents the results; Columns (1) and (2) use the model-free 
implied volatilities, and Columns (3) and (4) use Black-Scholes volatilities.  
Focusing on Columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on MNGFORECAST is 
                                                           
21  The results are robust to using trading days instead of calendar days.  In other words, 
I set the number of days for the one-month (two-month) maturity to 21 (42) and set 
the number of total days in a year to 252.  
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significantly positive when the dependent variable is VRPE_INT (12.476; t-stat = 
5.01) and when it is VRPE_MAXVLM (8.509; t-stat = 4.07).22  In addition, the 
large coefficients suggest that much of the positive effect found in Table 4 is 
attributable the earnings announcement period.23  I then replicate the results in 
Column (3) and (4) deriving earnings date VRPs based on Black-Scholes ATM 
volatilities.  Again, the coefficient on MNGFORECAST is significantly positive 
using VRPE_INT (12.460; t-stat = 5.69) or VRPE_MAXVLM (9.176; t-stat = 5.14).  
Overall, the results of this section show that the increase in the VRP for firms 
issuing management forecasts is primarily attributable to the earnings 
announcement period. 
<See Table 6> 
5.4 The Higher Moments of Skewness and Kurtosis 
The primary analyses provide evidence that (i) consistent with prior 
research, firms exhibit lower implied volatility when they issue management 
forecasts, and (ii) these instances also exhibit increased VRPs.  While seemingly 
                                                           
22  I do not try to interpret the results for the control variables because of the unique 
effect earnings announcements may have on the VRP on the earnings date.  For 
example, the positive coefficient on SIZE may be attributable to the volatility risk 
premium for bellwether firms in Barth and So (2014), although Han and Zhou (2012) 
finds that firm size is negatively associated with the VRP when not focusing on 
earnings dates.  Additionally, the negative coefficient on LOG_BTM may be caused by 
a greater AIC for growth stocks (e.g., Billings and Jennings 2011).   
23   For example, the estimated coefficient for MNGFORECAST in Column (3) of Table 4 
is 0.864.  If I assume that there are twenty trading days in a month and, because the 
results are based on daily variances, then using the coefficient from Column (1) of 
Table 6 shows that roughly 72% (12.476 / [0.864 x 20]) of guidance’s effect on VRP_30 
is attributable to the earnings announcement period. 
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contradictory, these results are not inconsistent with theory underlying implied 
volatilities and the VRP; that is, theory does not suggest that such uncertainty 
constructs must change in similar directions (e.g., Epstein and Ji 2013).  
Nonetheless, to provide further evidence, I next examine the effect of 
management forecast guidance on two higher moment measures of 
uncertainty—skewness and kurtosis—which may help to explain the observed 
results.   
Specifically, managerial guidance may affect (perceived) return asset 
moments beyond variance, which option traders may be especially sensitive to.  
Traders may, for example, worry that guidance signals a potential large 
upcoming surprise.  Accordingly, I now examine the level of option-implied 
skewness and kurtosis as a function of firm guidance.  The implied skewness 
gives an estimate of forward-looking crash risk; implied kurtosis reflects 
expectations about future jump probabilities, both negative and positive.  Thus, 
the issuance of management guidance may affect the option market’s view of 
future crashes and price jumps and, thus, provide a partial explanation of the 
results of the prior sections. 
Using 30-day implied volatilities, I calculate the daily implied skewness 
(ImpSKEW) and implied kurtosis (ImpKURT), along with similarly calculated 
macro-measures of expected skewness and kurtosis based on the SPX 
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(ImpSPXSKEW and ImpSPXKURT, respectively).24  Paralleling my calculation of 
implied volatilities and the VRP, I average the values over the trading days (–5, –
3) preceding the earnings announcement date.  I next convert the implied 
skewness and kurtosis values into their percentile ranks with the ranking done 
by quarter; I use ranks for this analysis due to calculation errors and other model 
fitting problems that can be particularly exacerbated when deriving higher 
moment uncertainty measures.25   
Table 7 presents the regression results; the analyses include the control 
variables from Table 4, as well as the SPX skew and kurtosis variables.  All 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. First, I examine the dependent variable of 
implied skewness in Columns (1) – (3).  Column (1) reveals that stock skewness 
is negatively related to past issuance of guidance (t-stat = 1.67) when only using 
the fixed effects; however, Column (2) shows that the negative relationship does 
not hold with the other controls (t-stat = 0.17) or if implied variance is added to 
the model as in Column (3) (t-stat = 0.75).  Accordingly, I fail to find consistent 
evidence that implied skewness is affected by the issuance of management 
forecast guidance. 
<See Table 7> 
                                                           
24  See Appendix B for calculation details. 
25  The results of this section are not found when using OLS but the kurtosis results are 
found when using robust regression (i.e., M-regression) after again adjusting for 
inter-firm medians in the variables.  This suggests that outliers influence the 
estimation.   
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I next examine the dependent variable of implied kurtosis (i.e., jump risk) 
in Columns (4) – (6).  Column (4) reveals that guidance is significantly positively 
related to implied kurtosis levels (coefficient = 1.232; t-stat = 3.65); further, this 
result is unchanged with the inclusion of the additional controls in Column (5) 
(0.909; t-stat = 2.73) and when implied variance is included as a control variable 
in Column (6) (1.032; t-stat = 3.11).26  This is consistent with the issuance of 
management forecasts leading to increased implied kurtosis. 
These results—combined with the findings from the previous sections—
provide an intuitive reconciliation of how management guidance can lead to 
both increased VRP and reduced implied volatility.  Specifically, while traders 
may view the issuance of management forecast guidance as reducing the 
expected variance of outcomes (i.e., reflected in reduced implied volatility), they 
also appear to view the issuance of management forecast guidance as increasing 
the likelihood of a price jumps (reflected in increased implied kurtosis).  In other 
words, guidance appears to simultaneously increase the probability of a low 
volatility state and also increases the market’s view of large upcoming surprises.  
The net effect of these two changes in the different dimensions of uncertainty can 
reflect the observed increase in VRP (or higher premium to provide option 
insurance). 
                                                           
26  While I do not report the full regression results, I find that firm size (book-to-market) 
is negatively (positively) associated with skew consistent with Harvey and Siddique 
(2000) and Zhang (2013).  
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6. ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT FORECAST ATTRIBUTES 
6.1  Quarterly versus Annual Guidance 
The tests in the prior section treat all managerial guidance as 
homogenous.  However, guidance has a number of attributes that may 
differentially affect the VRP.  One key attribute is the duration of the forecast; in 
other words, quarterly versus annual guidance.  In this setting, I predict that 
quarterly guidance will have a stronger positive effect on the VRP compared to 
annual guidance for two reasons.  First, quarterly forecasts (which definitionally 
relate to management guidance regarding the impending fiscal quarters results) 
are more likely to align with the uncertainty construct (which reflects the VRP—
and other uncertainty measures—focused on the immediate 30-day to 91-day 
window).  That is, use of quarterly management forecasts provides the strongest 
match in relevant horizon between the dependent and experimental variables.  
Second, traders may expect two states associated with shorter-term guidance: (i) 
a low-variance state, where quarterly guidance effectively removes all 
uncertainty about the forthcoming earnings report; and (ii) a high-variance or 
“jump” state, where the firm forecast may be a harbinger of additional surprising 
news with the earnings report.  This increase in variance uncertainty should lead 
traders to overvalue options ex ante.     
Accordingly, I define MNGFORECAST_Q (MNGFORECAST_A) as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues quarterly (annual) guidance 
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during the look-back window (as previously, measured –5 trading days before 
the previous earnings announcement date to –6 trading days before the 
upcoming earnings date).  Note that for a particular firm-quarter, both 
MNGFORECAST_Q and MNGFORECAST_A may be set to one if the firm issued 
both quarterly and annual guidance during the look-back period.  As shown in 
Table 2, 25.8% (31.3%) of quarterly earnings announcements are preceded by 
quarterly (annual) firm guidance.27 
Table 8 displays the regression results when separating quarterly and 
annual guidance and Panel A displays the results for VRP_30, VRP_61, and 
VRP_91. I focus first on Column (1), which presents the results using as the 
dependent variable VRP_30 (i.e., the VRP over the 30-day interval).  The 
coefficient on MNGFORECAST_Q is positive and significant (0.894; t-stat = 5.65), 
while that for MNGFORECAST_A is insignificant (0.039; t-stat = 0.025).  Similar 
results obtain using VRP_60 and VRP_91.  This indicates that the observed 
increase in the VRP, documented in Table 4, appears confined to quarterly 
guidance by firms.  The F-test confirms that the estimated coefficient on 
MNGFORECAST_Q statistically exceeds that on MNGFORECAST_A for VRP_30, 
VRP_61, and VRP_91. 
<See Table 8, Panel A> 
                                                           
27  14.6% of observations have both quarterly and annual guidance (untabulated). 
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Panel B displays the results for the earnings date VRP, skew, and kurtosis.  
Columns (1) and (2) present results corresponding to Table 6 Columns (1) and 
(2), which uses redefined VRP dependent variables to isolate the effect to 
uncertainty specific to the earnings announcement date.  Again, using either 
VRPE_INT in Column (1) or VRPE_MAXVLM in Column (2), the coefficients on 
MNGFORECAST_Q remain significantly positive, those on MNGFORECAST_A 
remain insignificant, and the differences between the two remain significant at 
the 1% level.  This again shows that the increase in the VRP is attributable to 
quarterly guidance.   
<See Table 8, Panel B> 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 then present the effect of quarterly versus 
annual guidance on option-implied skewness and kurtosis, corresponding to the 
results in Table 7.  As previously, Column (3) reveals that neither quarterly nor 
annual guidance is significantly associated with implied skewness.  However, 
Column (4) reveals that implied kurtosis is positively associated with 
MNGFORECAST_Q (1.362; t-stat = 3.61) and not with MNGFORECAST_A (0.019; 
t-stat = 0.05), with a significant F-test as well.  Combined, the Table 8 analyses 
suggest that the previous results are primarily attributable to quarterly 
management forecasts, which are more likely most informative about the 
upcoming earnings announcement.  
6.2 Other Management Forecast Attributes 
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The results of the prior section suggest that the increase in the VRP and 
implied kurtosis levels are due to quarterly forecasts.  However, even within 
quarterly forecasts, there is likely variation that leads to greater options market 
concerns regarding potential self-selection and surprising upcoming news that 
can cause increases in option-based protection prices.  Thus, I next examine 
which forecasts cause option traders to increase risk premiums. 
To focus on quarterly forecasts, I remove all firms that did not issue any 
quarterly guidance during the examined period from the sample (adjusted N = 
56,299).  Next, I identify three forecasts dimensions that I expect will 
incrementally increase the uncertainty surrounding the quarterly forecast: 
history of providing quarterly guidance, surprise of the forecast, and timing of 
the forecast.  First, I consider the firm’s history of providing quarterly guidance.  
The market will likely respond more cautiously toward forecasts provided by 
firms that guide infrequently.  Moreover, managers with less experience 
forecasting may be less accurate (Chen 2004).  Thus, for each firm I calculate the 
percentage of total quarters in the sample, for which quarterly guidance was 
provided.  Firms having a percentage higher than or equal to (less than) the 
sample median are indicated as regular (sporadic) guiders; the median is 33.3%.  
I denote sporadic forecasters with the indicator variable SPORADIC_Q. 
Second, I consider the surprise of the forecast.  The market will likely be 
suspicious of either negative or surprising guidance.  I define to two additional 
 38 
indicator variables: NEGSURPRISE_Q (an indicator variable equaling one if the 
forecast is considered negative at the time of issuance—i.e., below the analyst 
consensus) and ANYSURPRISE_Q (an indicator variable equaling one if the 
forecast is considered to have either negative or positive surprise at the time of 
issuance).  The sign of the forecast is determined by the FirstCall field 
“CIGCode_Desc”.   
Third, I consider the timing of the forecast.  I define the indicator 
MNGFORECAST45_Q equal to one if the last quarterly management forecast was 
provided less than or equal to forty-five days before the next earnings 
announcement.  I predict that guidance provided early in the quarter (i.e., 
bundled guidance) is more likely perceived as management providing additional 
information, while that provided late in the quarter is more likely perceived as 
surprising and potentially indicative that market expectations that are not 
aligned with upcoming results.28 
Using these latter three forecast attributes, I calculate the following two 
aggregate measures of management forecasts having high uncertainty:   
HIGH_UNCER1it = SPORADIC_Qit + NEGSURPRISE_Qit + 
MNGFORECAST45_Qit                                                                                                                                 (5) 
                                                           
28  The statistics of Table 2 suggest that the majority of forecasts are bundled (Rogers and 
Van Buskirk 2013). 
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HIGH_UNCER2it = SPORADIC_Qit + ANYSURPRISE_Qit + 
MNGFORECAST45_Qit                                                                                    (6) 
Thus, each variable is defined on a [0, 3] scale.29  Both proxy for management 
forecasts exhibiting qualities that are more likely to lead to increased uncertainty: 
that is, management forecasts having attributes that may lead traders to question 
the informativeness of the forecast.  The only difference between the two 
variables is that HIGH_UNCER1 incorporates the sign of the forecast surprise 
(i.e., negative surprise) while HIGH_UNCER2 incorporates the unsigned surprise 
of the forecast.  However, the predicted effect is the same for both: quarterly 
forecasts that have these attributes should exhibit a greater effect on the VRP and 
option-implied kurtosis.  Accordingly, I interact the two high uncertainty 
variables with MNGFORECAST_Q; I predict that the resulting coefficient on the 
interaction term will be positive.   
Table 9 shows the results.  Panel A displays the results for the VRP_30.  
Column (1) shows, as expected, the interaction term of MNGFORECAST x 
HIGH_UNCER1 is significantly positive (0.682; t-stat = 5.29).  Of note, the main 
effect on MNGFORECAST_Q is no longer significant.  This suggests that the 
increase in VRP is principally due to quarterly forecasts having the qualities of 
                                                           
29   For the reduced sample, SPORADIC_Q is set to one for 52.8% of observations, 
NEGSURPRISE_Q is set to one 9.1% of the time, ANYSURPRISE_Q is at 22.5%, and 
MNGFORECAST45_Q is set to one for 10.5% of observations.  Also note that for the 
reduced sample MNGFORECAST_Q is one for 37.5% of observations.  
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sporadic, negative surprise, and/or closer to the earnings announcement.  
Restated, management forecasts by regular issuers, that lack surprise content, 
and that are provided early in the quarter fail to exhibit increased VRP.  Column 
(2) uses HIGH_UNCER2; the interaction is again significantly positive (0.626; t-
stat = 5.28).  Columns (3) and (4) interact MNGFORECAST_Q with binary 
variables that are set to one when either HIGH_UNCER1 or HIGH_UNCER2 are 
positive.  The results are again similar; quarterly guidance that does not have at 
least one of the uncertain attributes are not associated with the VRP.  However, 
quarterly guidance that has at least one uncertain attribute are positively 
associated with the VRP.  Thus, results are robust across the aggregate measures 
of high uncertainty management forecasts.   
<See Table 9, Panel A> 
Panel B presents the result using option-implied kurtosis levels as the 
dependent variables.  Similar to above, implied kurtosis is not statistically related 
to quarterly management forecasts lacking the high uncertainty attributes.  
However, the significantly positive interaction terms suggest higher implied 
kurtosis using either HIGH_UNCER1 (1.337; t-stat = 4.49) or HIGH_UNCER2 
(1.235; t-stat = 4.20).  Both results are consistent with anticipated jump risk that is 
increasing with high uncertainty management forecasts.30 Finally, Columns (3) 
                                                           
30  I obtain similar results when using robust regression instead of ranking the kurtosis 
values. 
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and (4) show the results are similar when HIGH_UNCER1 and HIGH_UNCER2 
are converted in indicator variables when their values exceed zero.  
<See Table 9, Panel B> 
Overall, these results suggest that the previous findings of higher VRPs 
and increased kurtosis (i.e., price jump risk) principally are attributable to 
quarterly forecasts that are made by sporadic issuers, having surprise 
information, and closer to the impending earnings announcement.  
6.3 Forecast Type 
As a final test, I examine whether the forecast type (i.e., range, point, or 
other forecast types) help to explain the patterns in VRP and implied kurtosis.  It 
is possible that only ambiguous forecasts generate the observed relationships 
while more quantitative forecasts do not produce an increase the VRP.  For this 
set of tests I once again forecast only on the quarterly forecasts.  Table 10 displays 
the results using both the full sample and the reduced sample from Section 6.2   
Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample.  The results show that all types of 
forecasts lead to an increase in the VRP.  While the point estimates on the 
estimated coefficients suggest OTHER forecasts lead to a higher VRP, the F-tests 
cannot reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients are the sample.  The results 
for kurtosis show that only RANGE and POINT forecasts are associated with 
higher kurtosis levels.  However, the F-tests once again show that there is no 
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statistical difference between the estimated coefficients.  Lastly, Columns (3) and 
(4) show that these results hold when using the reduced sample. 
<See Table 10> 
7. CONCLUSION 
 I investigate the effect of voluntary disclosure—specifically management 
forecast guidance—on the difference between option-implied variance and 
subsequent realized variance (i.e., the variance risk premium, or VRP).  While I 
confirm prior research that firm guidance lowers uncertainty levels using 
implied variances as a proxy, I also find that the VRP is higher with guidance.  
This result is robust to a number of different modeling, sample construction, and 
control variable choices.  I also find that, after decomposing the implied variance 
term structure, a large portion of the increase in the VRP centers on the variance 
around earnings dates, confirming the linkage between the voluntary disclosure 
and uncertainty regarding the upcoming earnings announcement.  Critically, I 
then find that option-implied kurtosis levels (i.e., jump risk) increases when 
firms issue guidance.  Further tests reveal this increase to be strongest for firms 
issuing quarterly management guidance having attributes most likely to reflect 
increased uncertainty: guidance that is sporadic, having the largest surprise, and 
closest to the earnings announcement.  Overall, these results suggest that while 
voluntary disclosures can reduce implied volatilities, they can simultaneously 
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increase other uncertainty measures—suggesting uncertainty should be 
considered as a multi-dimensional construct.     
 Of note, the results further suggest that the extra information in 
managerial forecasts does not reduce the variance risk premium; this suggests 
that prior studies examining the effect of guidance on implied variances (e.g., 
Rogers et al. 2009; Billings et al. 2015) are picking up changes in expected 
variances.  The results of this study suggest that guidance may not reduce 
uncertainty when it is defined to include higher moments beyond variance and 
volatility.  In addition, while the tests provide evidence that the market may 
“overvalue” options when provided short-term forecasts due to changes in 
higher order risks, it is still unclear if the compensation provided to seller of 
derivatives is justified given the ex post realizations of variance.  There is still the 
possibility that equity option traders do not fully adjust to the amount of 
information that is provided with managerial guidance.  For example, Beyer et 
al. (2010) shows that a large amount of accounting information is attributable to 
managerial forecasts.  My results also do not completely rule out the possibility 
that option traders are underreacting to the information provided in 
management forecasts, questioning the assumption that expected variance is 
equal to realized variance (on average).  Finally, future research might examine 
how belief heterogeneity and information asymmetry affect my findings (e.g., 
Gandhi and Serrano-Padial, 2015).
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
ImpVar_30it 
The average implied daily model-free 30-day variance 
measured over trading days (–5, –3) preceding the 
earnings announcement for firm i. 
 
VRP_30it 
(VRP_60it) 
[VRP_91it] 
Firm i’s difference of its average implied daily model-
free 30- (60-) [91-] day variance measured over trading 
days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings announcement and 
the realized daily return variance of the stock over the 
30 (60) [91] calendar days starting at –2 trading days 
before the earnings announcement.   
 
VRPE_INTit 
The earnings date implied variance minus the squared 
equity return from trading days (–1, +1) around the 
earnings announcement date for firm i.  The implied 
earnings date variance is calculated either using model-
free or Black-Scholes implied volatilities over 30- and 
60-day horizons.  See text for calculation details.  
 
VRPE_MAXVLMit 
The earnings date implied variance minus the squared 
equity return for the date where the equity volume is 
greater selecting from trading days (–1, +1) around the 
earnings announcement date for firm i.  The implied 
earnings date variance is calculated either using model-
free or Black-Scholes implied volatilities over 30- and 
60-day horizons.  See text for calculation details. 
 
ImpSKEWit 
(ImpKURTit) 
The average implied skewness (kurtosis) over trading 
days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings announcement for 
firm i. 
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Experimental Variables 
MNGFORECASTit 
(MNGFORECAST_Ait) 
[MNGFORECAST_Qit] 
Indicator variable set to one if firm i provided a 
(annual) [quarterly] forecast over the look-back 
interval, defined as –5 trading days prior to the last 
earnings announcement to –6 trading days before the 
earnings announcement date. 
MNGFORECAST45_Qit 
Indicator variable set to one if firm i provided a 
quarterly managerial forecast 30 calendar days or less 
before the earnings announcement date by firm i. 
RANGE FORECASTit 
(POINT FORECASTit) 
[OTHER FORECASTit] 
Indicator variable set to one if firm i provided a range 
(point) [other] forecast.  This corresponds to FirstCall 
codes ‘B’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ (‘A’, ‘F’, or ‘Z’) [all other 
codes].   
POSSURPRISE_Qit 
(NEGSURPRISE_Qit) 
[ANYSURPRISE_Qit] 
Indicator variable set to one if the quarterly 
managerial forecast was considered a positive 
(negative) [positive or negative] surprise using 
FirstCall field “CIGCode_Desc”.   
SPORADIC_Qit 
Indicator variable set to one if the firm provides 
sporadic quarterly guidance to the market.  See the 
text for precise definition. 
HIGH_UNCER1 
(HIGH_UNCER2) 
Variable defined on [0, 3] scale and is the addition of 
SPORADIC_Q, MNGFORECAST45_Q, and 
NEGSURPRISE_Q (ANYSURPRISE_Qit). 
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Control Variables 
LOG_VIXt 
The log of the mean value of the VIX from trading days 
(–5, –3).  
FIRM_AGEit 
The square root of firm i’s age at year t in years, using 
the firm’s first instance in the Compustat quarterly 
database.   
ROEit 
Firm i’s income before extraordinary items divided by 
the book value of equity per share from quarter t–1. 
LOSSit 
An indicator variable equal to one if ROE for firm i for 
quarter t is less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
SIZEit 
The natural log of firm i’s total assets (in $ millions) at 
quarter t–1. 
LEVit 
The ratio of firm i’s total liabilities to total assets at 
quarter t–1. 
LOG_BTMit 
The natural log of book-to-market ratio for firm i, where 
total book common equity value is from quarter t–1 and 
equity value is at day t–3 to the earnings date for quarter 
t. 
LOG_FOLLit 
The natural log of the number quarterly EPS forecasts 
from analysts for the upcoming earnings announcement 
according to IBES for firm i and quarter t. 
LOG_HISTVOLit 
The natural log of firm i’s realized daily volatility over 
the period (–94, –3) preceding the earnings 
announcement day 0 for quarter t. 
ImpSPXSKEWt 
(ImpSPXKURTt) 
The average implied skewness (kurtosis) for the SPX 
index measured from trading days (–5, –3). 
%BID_ASKit 
The average percent bid-ask spread in the underlying 
equity over the last quarter from firm i. 
EXCESS_RET91it 
The excess buy-and-hold return for firm i over the last 
quarter using the CRSP value-weighted index as the 
market proxy. 
DISPit 
The standard deviation of analysts’ quarterly EPS 
forecasts for firm i and quarter t divided by the absolute 
value of the mean forecast plus 0.02. 
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Appendix 2: Model-Free Moment Estimates 
 
Model-Free Volatilities 
The below model, which incorporates the Black-Scholes model as a special 
case, approximates the total expected variance of the underlying asset as (e.g., 
Carr and Madan 1998; Demeterfi, Derman, Kamal, and Zou 1999; Britten-Jones 
and Neuberger 2000): 
                 [ ] 2 22 t
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∫ ∫                         (2.1) 
EQ[VARt] is the expected risk-neutral variance of the underlying over the period; 
P(τ, K) is the price of a European put for the given maturity and strike price; K is 
the strike price; C(τ, K) is the price of a European call for the given maturity and 
strike price; Ft is the forward price of the asset; τ is the time to maturity; and r is 
the risk-free interest rate.   
To generate the model-free volatility estimates for each asset/date/option 
maturity, I use the OptionMetrics surface database, which contains Black-Scholes 
implied volatilities for standardized maturities and strikes.  I calculate model free 
implied volatilities as follows: 
1) The forward price is given by OptionMetrics for the stock on the date for the 
particular expiration date.  If a forward price is not found for that particular 
asset for the date for the correct expiration date, I use a simple linear 
regression to interpolate or extrapolate the forward price from the other 
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available forward prices for the asset on that date.  If there are insufficient 
data points for a proper fitting of the regression line the following 
calculations were skipped and the observation was marked as missing. 
2) The implied volatility data in a month for each asset for each day is fit using 
the following (Gatheral, 2004; Gatheral and Jacquier, 2011): 
2 2var( ; , , , , ) ( ) ( )k a b s m a b k m k m sρ ρ = + − + − +
 
                        (2.2) 
var is the implied variance; k is the natural log of the strike price divided by 
forward price; and a, b, s, ρ, and m are the parameters to be fit.  
3) The model (2.2) is fit with a non-linear optimizer by minimizing the squared 
percentage error between the implied variances as given by OptionMetrics 
and the model fit.  As is common in industry, the model is fit using at-the-
money and out-of-the-money options.  The fitting algorithm was allowed to 
run for 10,000 loops.  If the algorithm does not converge, the best fit for the 
previous 10,000 loops is used as the solution.  I apply the following parameter 
restrictions as suggested by Gatheral and Jacquier (2014): 
a ∈ ℝ, b ≥ 0, |ρ| < 1, m ∈ ℝ and s > 0 
4) The values for the risk-free interest rate come from the OptionMetrics 
database.  
5) Finally, using the implied volatility curve fit for each maturity, equation (2.1) 
is approximated using at least 200 steps for the integral evaluation.  The 
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model fit of (2.2) from the previous steps is used to price the European 
options needed in the formula.  An adaptive algorithm is used so that a 
sufficient number of option values are used and that the minimum and 
maximum strike used a sufficient for the integral evaluation. 
 
Skew and Kurtosis 
From Backus, Foresi, and Wu (2004), implied volatility at a normalized strike d 
has the following relationship with ATM volatility (ATMV): 
   
2( ) 1
6 24
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After some simple algebra: 
[ ] 2( ) / 1
6 24
SKEW KURTOSIS
IV d ATMV d d− ≈ +                              (2.4) 
Thus, for each day for each stock I estimate the relationship (B.4) using the 
following procedure: 
1) Retrieve the forward price from the OptionMetrics database (F). 
2) Get all the implied volatilities with an absolute delta less than or equal to 50 
from the OptionMetrics surface database for the 30-day maturities. 
3) Set ATMV and σ equal to the mean of the 50 delta put and 50 delta call 
implied volatilities. 
4) Compute the left hand side of (B.3) for each implied volatility and d using the 
calculated σ and strike (K) for the implied volatilities. 
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5) Find the SKEW and KURTOSIS value by using a WLS regression without the 
intercept.  For the conditional variance matrix, the diagonal element is set to 
the ratio of the implied volatility for the strike divided by the ATMV squared. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Expected Effects of Forecast Guidance on Variance Risk Premium 
 
 
This figure graphically presents the two predictions under H1 of how the issuance of management forecasts can 
affect the variance risk premium (VRP) before earnings announcements.  Both predictions assume that 
management forecasts reduce implied variances before earnings announcements, consistent with prior research.  
Column (1) presents the effect of no management forecast; Column (2) presents that under the prediction of an 
increased VRP; and Column (3) presents that under the prediction of a decreased VRP.  Note that the sizes of the 
expected variance and the variance risk premium are not drawn to scale.   
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Figure 2: Timeline of Measurement for the Dependent and Experimental Variables 
 
  
 
This figure displays the timeline for measuring the dependent variable (the variance risk premium, or VRP) and 
experimental variable (the issuance of management forecast, or MNGFORECAST).  To derive the dependent 
variables of VRP_30, VRP_60, and VRP_91—representing the VRP for 30-, 60-, and 91-day maturities, 
respectively—I take the difference between the implied variance (denoted (B) above, measured over trading days –
5 to –3 before the earnings announcement of quarter t) and the subsequent realized variance (denoted (C) above, 
measured over either 30 calendars days (30C), 60 calendar days (60C), or 91 calendar days (91C) following the 
earnings announcement of quarter t).  To derive MNGFORECAST, I examine if firm i issues a management forecast 
during the look-back interval denoted (A) above: this interval is defined starting day –5 prior to the earnings 
announcement for quarter t – 1 (EAt-1) until day –6 prior to the earnings announcement of quarter t (EAt).     
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Figure 3: Variance Risk Premium by Quarter 
 
 
 
This figure presents a plot of quarterly fixed effects regressed alternatively onto the 30-, 60-, and 91-day variance 
risk premiums (VRP_30, VRP_60 and VRP_91, respectively); no other independent variables are included.  Model-
free implied volatilities are used; the quarter is based on the earnings announcement date; and the variance risk 
premiums are multiplied by 10,000.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
Panel A. Sample Construction 
  
Deleted 
Obs Total Obs 
Unique 
Firms 
All IBES quarterly observations (2000–2011) 190,353 10,932 
Less: Unmatched with Compustat  –27,376  162,977 8,710 
          Unmatched with CRSP –15,270 147,707 6,699 
          Non-positive book assets –257 147,450 6,693 
          Non-positive book stockholder's equity –3,671 143,779 6,623 
          Unable to calculate historical or forward realized 
volatility –1,847 141,932 6,529 
          Missing implied volatilities –55,813 86,119 4,415 
          Difference between quarterly earnings 
announcements is either too short or too long –4,295 81,824 4,391 
Final Sample 81,824 4,391 
 
Panel B. Observations by Economic Sector 
Economic Sector 2-Digit SIC 
Number of 
Observations 
Unique 
Firms 
Agriculture 1 – 9 207 11 
Mining 10 – 14 4,072 220 
Construction 15 – 19 1,052 48 
Manufacturing 20 – 39 35,095 1,773 
Transportation/Public Utilities 40 – 49 7,827 439 
Wholesale Trade 50 – 51 2,127 102 
Retail Trade 52 – 59 5,701 249 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 60 – 69 11,679 663 
Services 70 – 89 13,937 882 
Public Administration/Unclassified 90 – 99 127 7 
 
Panel A shows the sample selection process, and Panel B shows the number of 
observations by economic sector.  Quarterly IBES observations are considered 
valid if there was at least one analyst EPS forecast and the dates are based on the 
earnings announcement date.  Compustat data is from quarter t – 1.  CRSP data 
is required for calculating historical and forward-looking realized volatilities.  
Options data is valid if model-free and Black-Scholes implied volatilities are 
found for trading days (–5, –3) before the quarterly earnings date for the 30, 60 
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and 91-day maturities.  Earnings date differences are the number of calendar 
days between the earnings announcement dates from IBES for quarter t and that 
for quarter t – 1 per Compustat (field RDQ); observations are excluded if this 
difference is either less than 60 days or greater than 120 days.  Unique firms per 
Panel A may not equal those per Panel B due to firms having operations in 
multiple SICs.   
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Table 2. Management Forecasts Statistics 
 
Panel A. Forecast Statistics 
  
Quarterly 
Management 
Forecasts 
Annual 
Management 
Forecasts 
Full  
Sample 
Number of Observations 21,097 25,598 81,824 
% of Total Observations 25.8% 31.3% 100% 
Number of Unique Firms 2,193 2,106 4,391 
% RANGE Forecasts 76.0% 84.0% N/A 
% POINT Forecasts 16.9% 11.5% N/A 
% OTHER Forecasts 7.1% 4.5% N/A 
Mean Forecast Interval (Days) 69.8 78.1 N/A 
Median Forecast Interval (Days) 85.0 90.0 N/A 
 
Panel B. Annual Distributions 
Year 
Quarterly 
Forecasts 
Annual 
Forecasts 
All Least One 
Forecast 
Total 
Observations 
% With 
Forecast 
2000 846 528 1,082 4,865 22.2% 
2001 1,723 1,154 2,130 4,905 43.4% 
2002 2,010 1,660 2,629 5,677 46.3% 
2003 1,809 1,843 2,599 5,527 47.0% 
2004 1,984 2,176 3,003 6,062 49.5% 
2005 1,960 2,265 3,000 6,479 46.3% 
2006 1,993 2,538 3,273 6,904 47.4% 
2007 1,976 2,742 3,485 7,559 46.1% 
2008 1,850 2,815 3,495 7,978 43.8% 
2009 1,575 2,406 3,135 8,008 39.1% 
2010 1,652 2,673 3,388 8,605 39.4% 
2011 1,719 2,798 3,527 9,255 38.1% 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the management forecasts.  Panel A 
shows the number and types of forecasts used, and Panel B shows the annual 
distributions.  Managerial forecast data is obtained from First Call.  A quarterly 
or annual forecast is set to one for a quarterly earnings announcement if the firm 
issued a forecast from –5 trading days prior to the last earnings announcement to 
–6 trading days before the earnings announcement date.  A RANGE forecast is a 
forecast having an upper and lower bound (code ‘B’, ‘G’, or ‘H’); a POINT 
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forecast is a forecast having a specific forecasted value (code ‘A’, ‘F’, or ‘Z’); and 
OTHER forecasts includes all other forecast categories.  The forecast interval is 
the number of calendar days between the managerial forecast date and the 
earnings announcement date. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
  25th Percentile Median Mean 75th Percentile 
VRP_30 (x10,000) –0.572 2.355 1.840 6.498 
VRP_60 (x10,000) –0.230 2.080 2.277 5.771 
VRP_91 (x10,000) –0.676 1.682 1.521 5.024 
ImpVar_30 (x10,000) 5.665 10.430 15.100 19.230 
LOG_VIX –1.853 –1.583 –1.573 –1.362 
FIRM_AGE 2.971 3.915 4.124 5.152 
ROE (x100) 0.439 2.653 1.658 4.731 
LOSS 0.000 0.000 0.217 0.000 
SIZE 6.103 7.329 7.441 8.628 
LEV 0.309 0.510 0.501 0.676 
LOG_BTM –1.349 –0.813 –0.861 –0.331 
LOG_FOLL 1.609 2.079 1.993 2.565 
LOG_HISTVOL –4.050 –3.688 –3.671 –3.311 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the primary dependent and 
independent variables.  VRP_30, VRP_60, and VRP_91 is the difference between 
the 30-, 60-, and 91-day implied daily variance and the subsequent realized daily 
variance for 30, 60 and 91 calendar days, respectively. The implied model-free 
variances are measured over trading days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings 
announcement date (see Appendix 2 for details on the implied variance 
calculations).  The realized variance is measured over the 30, 60, or 91 calendar 
day interval starting from –2 trading days preceding the earnings announcement 
date.   
 
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  All statistics calculated after 
winsorizing the variables at the 1 and 99 percent levels.   
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Table 4. The Effect of Managerial Forecasts on the Variance Risk Premium 
 
Panel A. Implied Variance 
 
Predicted Dependent Variable: 
Variable Sign ImpVar_30 log(ImpVar_30) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
MNGFORECAST - -0.882 (  5.48 ***) -0.500 (  5.50 ***) -0.357 (  3.20 ***) -2.592 (  4.86 ***) 
LOG_VIX +   2.512 (21.17 ***) 2.454 (22.22 ***) 20.092 (37.21 ***) 
FIRM_AGE -   -0.532 (  8.33 ***) -11.621 (13.19 ***) -19.250 (  5.14 ***) 
ROE -   -0.870 (12.59 ***) -0.507 (  7.17 ***) -0.661 (  2.74 ***) 
LOSS +   2.577 (17.02 ***) 0.925 (  6.38 ***) 4.976 (  8.24 ***) 
SIZE -   -1.506 (15.39 ***) -1.938 (  5.15 ***) -22.882 (14.25 ***) 
LEV +   0.370 (  4.60 ***) 1.433 (  9.25 ***) 9.213 (13.96 ***) 
LOG_BTM +   0.811 (11.24 ***) 2.211 (17.61 ***) 11.295 (23.07 ***) 
FOLLOW -   -0.194 (  2.85 ***) 0.040 (  0.38      ) 0.625 (  1.35      ) 
LOG_HISTVOL +   8.407 (89.83 ***) 6.612 (59.14 ***) 45.036 (78.16 ***) 
  
 
  
Fixed Effects 
 
Firm, Quarter Industry, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 
 
64.5% 65.7% 72.9% 83.3% 
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Table 4. The Effect of Managerial Forecasts on the Variance Risk Premium - Continued 
 
Panel B. Variance Risk Premium 
 
 
Predicted Dependent Variable: 
 Variable Sign VRP_30 VRP_60 VRP_91 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MNGFORECAST (+/–) H1 0.803 (  5.34 ***) 0.277 (  2.59***) 0.864 (  5.73 ***) 0.598 (  4.76 ***) 0.525 (  4.14 ***) 
LOG_VIX +   
 
2.205 (11.58***) 1.948 (10.15 ***) 1.878 (11.82 ***) 1.744 (12.12 ***) 
FIRM_AGE –   
 
-0.034 (  0.52     ) 1.458 (  1.85 †   ) 3.056 (  4.47  †  ) 5.98 (  8.03 †   ) 
ROE –   
 
-0.137 (  1.55     ) 0.064 (  0.65     ) 0.032 (  0.39      ) -0.022 (  0.28      ) 
LOSS +   
 
0.214 (  1.13     ) 0.008 (  0.04     ) -0.005 (  0.03      ) -0.008 (  0.04      ) 
SIZE –   
 
-0.784 (  7.60 ***) -0.450 (  1.13     ) -2.333 (  6.72 ***) -3.617 (  9.54 ***) 
LEV +   
 
-0.036 (  0.41     ) 0.074 (  0.43     ) 0.831 (  5.66 ***) 1.154 (  7.88 ***) 
LOG_BTM +   
 
0.195 (  2.32 ** ) 0.110 (  0.70     ) 1.101 (  8.17 ***) 1.537 (10.81 ***) 
FOLLOW –   
 
-0.624 (  8.12 ***) -0.530 (  4.23 ***) -0.449 (  4.16 ***) -0.445 (  3.93 ***) 
LOG_HISTVOL +   
 
-0.284 (  2.88 †  ) 0.428 (  3.75 ***) 0.865 (  8.90 ***) 0.853 (  8.64 ***) 
  
  
   
    
  
Fixed Effects 
 
Firm, Quarter Industry, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 
 
15.8% 9.6% 16.0% 21.2% 28.8% 
 
 
This table presents results from regressions examining the effect of managerial forecasts on implied variance and 
the variance risk premium (VRP); N = 81,824 for all regressions.  The dependent variables are: in Columns (1) 
through (3) of Panel A ImpVar_30 is the model-free implied variance and Column (4) it is the natural log of 
ImpVar_30; in Columns (1) through (5) of Panel B, VRP_30, VRP_60, and VRP_91 is the difference between the 30-, 
60-, and 91-day implied model-free daily variance and the subsequent realized daily variance for 30, 60 and 91 
calendar days, respectively.  The implied model-free variances are measured over the trading days (–5, –3) 
  
61
preceding the earnings announcement date (see Appendix 2).  The realized variance is measured over the indicated 
horizon (30, 60, or 91 calendar days) starting on day –2 preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  
The experimental variable, MNGFORECAST, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i issues a management 
earnings forecast during the look-back interval, defined as –5 trading days preceding the earnings announcement 
to quarter t–1 through –6 trading days preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.   
 
Appendix 1 provides definitions for all other variables.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile, and all continuous independent variables are standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting 
announcement date and industry is based on two-digit SIC codes.  All standard errors are clustered by firm.  ***, ** 
and * denote variables that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the indicated one-tailed or two-tailed 
tests, respectively.  † denotes variables that are statistically significant at the 10% level but the predicted and 
estimated signs do not match.  All coefficients are multiplied by 10,000 except Panel A, Column (4) where 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests 
 
Panel A. Black-Scholes Implied Variances 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 Variable BS_VRP_30 BS_VRP_60 BS_VRP_91 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
MNGFORECAST (+/–) 0.852 (  5.85 ***) 0.624 (  5.35 ***) 0.627 (  5.34 ***) 
LOG_VIX (+) 1.754 (  9.54 ***) 1.558 (10.45 ***) 1.449 (10.90 ***) 
FIRM_AGE (–) 1.007 (  1.36      ) 2.133 (  3.45 ***) 4.797 (  6.90 ***) 
ROE (–) 0.036 (  0.37      ) 0.044 (  0.57      ) 0.043 (  0.57      ) 
LOSS (+) –0.076 (  0.39      ) -0.197 (  1.24      ) -0.361 (  2.28 **  ) 
SIZE (–) –0.093 (  0.24      ) -1.299 (  4.07 ***) -2.281 (  6.53 ***) 
LEV (+) –0.129 (  0.78      ) 0.397 (  2.85 ***) 0.599 (  4.26 ***) 
LOG_BTM (+) –0.109 (  0.72      ) 0.506 (  3.97 ***) 0.807 (  5.88 ***) 
LOG_FOLL (–) –0.476 (  4.00 ***) -0.358 (  3.66 ***) -0.406 (  3.98 ***) 
LOG_HISTVOL (+) –0.039 (  0.35      ) 0.117 (  1.26      ) -0.129 (  1.35      ) 
  
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 16.4% 21.1% 29.5% 
N 81,824 81824 81824 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests - Continued 
 
Panel B. Percentage Variance Risk Premium 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 Variable %_VRP_30 %_VRP_60 %_VRP_91 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
MNGFORECAST (+/–) 4.863 (  6.04 ***) 3.275 (  4.61 ***) 2.553 (  3.82 ***) 
LOG_VIX (+) 22.645 (20.96 ***) 23.703 (25.76 ***) 20.021 (25.65 ***) 
FIRM_AGE (–) 31.210 (  6.74 †   ) 36.015 (  8.68 †   ) 31.748 (  8.01 †   ) 
ROE (–) 0.056 (  0.14      ) 0.384 (  1.11     ) 0.432 (  1.28      ) 
LOSS (+) -0.692 (  0.73      ) -0.777 (  0.93     ) -0.403 (  0.50      ) 
SIZE (–) -4.730 (  2.27 **  ) -9.415 (  5.06***) -11.784 (  6.36 ***) 
LEV (+) 1.076 (  1.35      ) 3.494 (  4.96***) 3.687 (  5.40 ***) 
LOG_BTM (+) 3.475 (  5.48 ***) 5.617 (  9.69***) 6.345 (10.98 ***) 
LOG_FOLL (–) -1.936 (  3.09 ***) -1.724 (  3.04***) -1.198 (  2.12 **  ) 
LOG_HISTVOL (+) -3.506 (  5.55 †   ) -0.827 (  1.45     ) 2.680 (  4.90 ***) 
  
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 22.3% 29.0% 36.7% 
N 81,824 81,824 81,824 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests - Continued 
 
Panel C. Sub-Sample Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: VRP_30 
 Variable Excluding 2000 Excluding 2001 Excluding Crisis Obs. 
(1) (2) (3) 
MNGFORECAST (+/–) 0.670 (  4.57 ***) 0.807 (  5.19 ***) 0.722 (  5.22 ***) 
LOG_VIX (+) 2.166 (11.41 ***) 2.230 (11.57 ***) 1.694 (11.84 ***) 
FIRM_AGE (–) -0.106 (  0.14      ) 3.184 (  3.78 †   ) 1.292 (  1.77 †   ) 
ROE (–) 0.023 (  0.25      ) 0.016 (  0.15      ) -0.035 (  0.38      ) 
LOSS (+) 0.065 (  0.32      ) -0.061 (  0.29      ) -0.002 (  0.01      ) 
SIZE (–) 0.114 (  0.30      ) -0.858 (  2.05 **  ) -1.208 (  3.24 ***) 
LEV (+) -0.405 (  2.45 **  ) 0.065 (  0.37      ) 0.471 (  3.01 ***) 
LOG_BTM (+) -0.662 (  4.42 †   ) -0.019 (  0.12      ) 1.101 (  8.17 ***) 
LOG_FOLL (–) -0.639 (  5.15 ***) -0.554 (  4.29 ***) -0.340 (  2.99 ***) 
LOG_HISTVOL (+) 0.601 (  5.63 ***) 0.341 (  3.03 ***) 1.007 (11.13 ***) 
  
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 17.2% 17.3% 17.1% 
N 76,959 76,919 73,893 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests - Continued 
 
Panel D: Ranked Results 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Variable pRank(VRP_30) pRank(VRP_60) pRank(VRP_91) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
MNGFORECAST (+/–) 1.839 (  5.69 ***) 1.209 (  3.74 ***) 0.912 (  2.78 ***) 
LOG_VIX (+) 7.373 (17.22 ***) 8.804 (20.88 ***) 8.086 (20.14 ***) 
FIRM_AGE (–) 5.051 (  2.91 †   ) 10.888 (  6.24 †   ) 15.736 (  8.59 †   ) 
ROE (–) 0.058 (  0.33      ) 0.236 (  1.32      ) 0.161 (  0.89      ) 
LOSS (+) 0.503 (  1.19      ) 0.465 (  1.10      ) 0.709 (  1.72 *   ) 
SIZE (–) -3.702 (  4.31 ***) -8.032 (  9.37 ***) -10.335 (10.97 ***) 
LEV (+) 1.483 (  4.31 ***) 3.319 (  9.77 ***) 3.918 (11.00 ***) 
LOG_BTM (+) 2.437 (  8.78 ***) 4.252 (14.59 ***) 5.118 (16.04 ***) 
LOG_FOLL (–) -0.346 (  1.30      ) -0.544 (  2.02 **  ) -0.210 (  0.73      ) 
LOG_HISTVOL (+) 4.430 (19.64 ***) 5.760 (25.18 ***) 6.414 (27.23 ***) 
  
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 12.5% 16.9% 16.2% 
N 81,824 81,824 81,824 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests - Continued 
 
Panel E. Other Control Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: VRP_30 
Sample: All #Analysts ≥ 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MNGFORECAST (+/–) 1.001 (  6.69 ***) 0.856 (  5.68 ***) 0.942 (  6.22 ***) 0.655 (  4.25 ***) 0.899 (  5.78 ***) 
ImpVar_30 (+) 5.354 (28.67 ***) 4.094 (19.55 ***) 
%BID_ASK (+)   0.475 (  3.91 ***) 0.612 (  4.85 ***) 
EXCESS_RET91 (+/–)   0.639 (  8.62 ***) 1.014 (13.29 ***) 
DISP (+)   -0.048 (  0.61      ) -0.166 (  2.12 †   ) 
  
Other Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
  
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 20.5% 16.0% 16.2% 15.4% 18.8% 
N 81,824 81,824 81,824 62,381 62,381 
 
 
This table presents select robustness tests for the main results.  For Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Panel A the 
dependent variables are BS_VRP_30, BS_VRP_60, and BS_VRP_91 which are the difference between the 30-, 60-, 
and 91-day Black-Scholes ATM implied daily variance and the subsequent realized daily variance for 30, 60, and 91 
calendar days respectively.  For Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Panel B the dependent variable is %_VRP_30, 
%_VRP_60, and %_VRP_91 which are the log-ratio between the 30-, 60-, and 91-day model-free implied daily 
variance and the subsequent realized daily variance for 30, 60, and 91 calendar days respectively.  Panel C displays 
the regression results using sub-samples and using VRP_30 at the dependent variable.  Column (1) removing all  
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observations from year 2000, Column (2) removes all observations from 2001, and Column (3) removes all 
observations from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009.  Panel D displays the results when 
converting VRP_30, VRP_60, and VRP_91 into percentile ranks (‘pRank’) with the ranking performed by quarter.  
Panel E shows the regression results when adding additional control variables.  Columns (1) – (3) use the full 
sample from Table 1 and column (4) and (5) use the observations where the number of analysts providing EPS 
forecasts is at least five. 
 
In all columns, the implied model-free and Black-Scholes variances are measured over the trading days (–5, –3) 
preceding the earnings announcement date (see Appendix 2).  The realized variance is measured over the indicated 
horizon (30, 60, or 91 calendar days) starting on day –2 preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  
The experimental variable, MNGFORECAST, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i issues a management 
earnings forecast during the look-back period, defined as –5 trading days preceding the earnings announcement to 
quarter t–1 through –6 trading days preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  The Other Controls of 
Panel E are LOG_VIX, FIRM_AGE, ROE, LOSS, SIZE, LEV, LOG_BTM, LOG_FOLL, and LOG_HISTVOL.   
 
Appendix 1 provides definitions for all other variables.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile, and all continuous independent variables are standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting 
announcement date.  All standard errors are clustered by firm.  ***, ** and * denote variables that are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the indicated one-tailed or two-tailed tests, respectively.  † denotes variables that are 
statistically significant at the 10% level but the predicted and estimated signs do not match.  All coefficients in 
Panels A, C, and E are multiplied by 10,000 and all coefficients in Panels B and D are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 6. Managerial Forecasts and the Implied Earnings Date Variance Risk Premium 
 
 Variance Estimate: Model-Free Black-Scholes 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
VRPE_INT VRPE_MAXVLM VRPE_INT VRPE_MAXVLM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MNGFORECAST 12.476 (5.01 ***) 8.509 (4.07  ***) 12.460 (5.69 ***) 9.176 (5.14 ***) 
LOG_VIX 2.805 (0.92      ) 17.215 (6.77  ***) 1.994 (0.75       ) 15.792 (7.54 ***) 
FIRM_AGE  23.156 (1.84 *   ) 4.729 (0.44       ) 22.520 (2.11 **   ) 0.423 (0.05      ) 
ROE 1.779 (1.16      ) 1.383 (1.15       ) 2.473 (1.79 *    ) 2.723 (2.53 **  ) 
LOSS –6.083 (1.83 *   ) –1.908 (0.68       ) –2.641 (0.88       ) 0.449 (0.18      ) 
SIZE 17.627 (2.92 ***) 10.273 (1.96 *    ) 32.963 (6.04  ***) 21.680 (4.78 ***) 
LEV –14.051 (5.14 ***) –8.956 (3.90  ***) –19.939 (8.17  ***) –14.986 (7.66 ***) 
LOG_BTM –5.163 (2.32 **  ) –1.439 (0.79       ) –16.889 (8.42  ***) –10.996 (6.96 ***) 
LOG_FOLL –4.586 (2.29 **  ) –3.925 (2.37  **  ) –4.481 (2.57  ** ) –3.499 (2.49 **  ) 
LOG_HISTVOL –4.227 (2.34 **  ) 3.693 (2.50  **  ) –6.269 (3.93  ***) 2.739 (2.14 **  ) 
            
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 7.9% 9.4% 7.8% 8.7% 
N 61,226 61,226 71,748 71,748 
 
This table presents results examining the effect of management forecasts on the variance risk premium specific to 
the earnings announcement.  The implied earnings date variance is calculated using the formula detailed in the text 
using 30- and 60-day implied variances.  The implied variances are measured (–5, –3) trading days before the 
earnings announcement date.  See Appendix 2 for more details on the model-free implied variance calculations.  
The Black-Scholes calculations use the mean implied volatilities of the 50 delta call and puts to calculate the 30 and 
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60 implied variances. Columns (1) and (3) using VRPE_INT as the dependent variable set the realized variance to 
the square of the stock return from –1 to +1 trading days around the earnings announcement date.  Columns (2) 
and (4) using VRPE_MAXVLM as the dependent variable set the realized variance to the squared stock return for 
the date with maximum trading volume using the –1 to +1 trading days around the earnings announcement date.  
The variance risk premium is the implied earnings date variance minus the subsequent realized variance.  The 
experimental variable, MNGFORECAST, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i issues a management 
earnings forecast during the period –5 trading days preceding the earnings announcement to quarter t–1 through –
6 trading days preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.   
 
Appendix 1 provides definitions for all other variables.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile, and all continuous independent variables are standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting 
announcement date.  All standard errors are clustered by firm.  ***, ** and * denote variables that are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, two-sided respectively.  All coefficients are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 7. Managerial Guidance and Implied Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
  pRank(ImpSKEW) pRank(ImpKURT) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MNGFORECAST –0.597 –0.059 –0.260 1.232 0.909 1.032 
  (  1.67 *) (  0.17      ) (  0.75      ) (  3.65 ***) (  2.73 ***) (  3.11 ***) 
LOG_VIX  2.534 4.084   –1.580 –2.527 
  
 (  6.08 ***) (  9.87 ***)   (  3.78 ***) (  6.03 ***) 
ImpSPXSKEW  0.972 1.122   –0.123 –0.214 
  
 (  4.84 ***) (  5.68 ***)   (  0.60      ) (  1.05      ) 
ImpSPXKURT  0.923 1.033   0.092 0.024 
  
 (  4.75 ***) (  5.41 ***)   (  0.46      ) (  0.12      ) 
ImpVAR_30   –7.941    4.851 
    (33.33 ***)    (19.46 ***) 
      
Other Controls Not Included Included Included Not Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 15.9% 17.4% 19.4% 14.6% 15.1% 15.9% 
 
This table presents the partial regression results of the effect of management forecast guidance on the percentile 
rank (‘pRank’) of implied skewness and kurtosis.  N = 81,824 for each regression.  ImpSKEW and ImpKURT are the 
average implied skewness and kurtosis values, measured over trading days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings 
announcement date; ranks are calculated within quarter.  ImpSPXSKEW and ImpSPXKURT are the similarly 
calculated implied skewness and kurtosis values for the SPX.  See Appendix 2 for details on the implied skewness 
and kurtosis calculations.   
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The experimental variable, MNGFORECAST, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i issues a management 
earnings forecast during the look-back period, defined as –5 trading days preceding the earnings announcement to 
quarter t–1 through –6 trading days preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  The other controls 
are as follows: FIRM_AGE, ROE, LOSS, SIZE, LEV, LOG_BTM, LOG_FOLL and LOG_HISTVOL.  See Appendix 1 
for variable definitions.  All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile and all 
continuous independent variables are standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting announcement date and 
all standard errors are clustered by firm.  ***, ** and * denote variables that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, two-sided respectively.  All coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 8. Management Forecasts Attributes: Forecast Duration 
 
Panel A. Variance Risk Premium 
 
Dependent Variable: 
  VRP_30 VRP_60 VRP_91 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
MNGFORECAST_Q 0.894 (5.65 ***) 0.639 (5.00 ***) 0.637 (4.99 ***) 
MNGFORECAST_A 0.039 (0.25      ) -0.069 (0.53      ) -0.125 (0.95      ) 
  
F-test (MNGFORECAST_Q  11.97 *** 12.59 *** 14.43*** 
   = MNGFORECAST_A)   
  
Controls (per Table 3) Included Included Included 
Macro Controls (per Table 7) Not Included Not Included Not Included 
  
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 16.0% 21.2% 28.8% 
N 81,824 81,824 81,824 
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Table 8. Management Forecasts Attributes: Forecast Duration - Continued 
 
Panel B. Earnings Date Variance Risk Premium, Skew, and Kurtosis 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
  VRPE_INT VRPE_MAXVLM pRank(ImpSKEW) pRank(ImpKURT) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
MNGFORECAST_Q 13.147 (4.88 ***) 10.243 (4.46 ***) 0.197 (0.54     ) 1.362 (3.61 ***) 
MNGFORECAST_A 2.095 (0.82      ) 0.641 (0.30      ) –0.628 (1.64     ) 0.019 (0.05      ) 
 
  
     
F-test (MNGFORECAST_Q  7.10 *** 7.47 *** 2.00 5.08 ** 
   = MNGFORECAST_A)   
     
 
  
     
Controls (per Table 3) Included Included Included Included 
Macro Controls (per Table 7) Not Included Not Included Included Included 
 
  
     
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 7.9% 9.4% 17.4% 15.1% 
N 61,226 61,226 81,824 81,824 
 
This table presents additional analyses examining the effect of quarterly versus annual management forecasts on 
the variance risk premium and other measures of uncertainty (option-implied skewness and kurtosis).  In Columns 
(1) – (3) of Panel A, the dependent variables are VRP_30, VRP_60, and VRP_91 which are the difference between 
the 30-, 60-, and 91-day implied daily variance minus the subsequent realized daily variance for 30, 60, and 91 
calendar days respectively. The implied model-free variances are measured (–5, –3) trading days before the 
earnings announcement date (see Appendix 2).  The realized variance is measured over the 30 calendar day 
horizon starting on day –2 preceding the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  The variance risk premium is 
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the daily implied variance minus the subsequent realized variance.  In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B, the 
dependent variables are the implied earnings date variances of VRPE_INT and VRPE_MAXVLM (respectively),  
calculated using the formula detailed in the text using 30-and 60-day implied volatilities to isolate the uncertainty 
effects attributable to the earnings announcement date (see Appendix 1 for variable definitions).  In Columns (3) 
and (4) of Panel B, the dependent variables are the rank of ImpSKEW and ImpKURT (respectively), defined as the 
average implied skewness and kurtosis values, measured over trading days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings 
announcement date; for both variables, pRank denotes the percentile rank, with ranks are calculated within quarter.   
 
MNGFORECAST_Q (MNGFORECAST_A) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues a quarterly 
(annual) forecast during the look-back interval, defined as –5 trading days prior to the last earnings announcement 
to –6 trading days before the earnings announcement date.   
 
The control variables (following Table 3) include the following: LOG_VIX, FIRM_AGE, ROE, LOSS, SIZE, LEV, 
LOG_BTM, LOG_FOLL and LOG_HISTVOL.  The macro controls variables (following Table 7) further include 
ImpSPXSKEW and ImpSPXKURT, which are the implied skewness and kurtosis values for the SPX.  See Appendix 
1 for variable definitions and see Appendix 2 for details on the implied skewness and kurtosis calculations.   
   
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile and all continuous independent variables are 
standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting announcement date and all standard errors are clustered by 
firm.  ***, ** and * denote variables that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, two-sided respectively.  All 
coefficients in Panel A and Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B are multiplied by 10,000 and all coefficients in Columns 
(3) and (4) of Panel B are multiplied by 100. 
  
75
TABLE 9. High Uncertainty Management Forecasts and the Variance Risk Premium and Implied Kurtosis 
 
Panel A. Variance Risk Premium 
 
 
 
  
  Dependent Variable: VRP_30 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
MNGFORECAST_Q 0.144 (0.77      ) -0.005 (0.02      ) 0.249 (1.34      ) 0.230 (1.09      ) 
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER1 0.682 (5.29 ***) 
      
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER2   
 
0.626 (5.28 ***) 
    
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER1 > 0   
   
0.884 (4.78 ***) 
  
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER2 > 0   
     
0.715 (3.77 ***) 
 
  
       
Controls (per Table 3) Included Included Included Included 
Macro Controls (per Table 7) Not Included Not Included Not Included Not Included 
 
  
       
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 12.3% 12.2% 12.2% 12.2% 
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TABLE 9. High Uncertainty Management Forecasts and the Variance Risk Premium and Implied Kurtosis - 
Continued 
 
Panel B. Implied Kurtosis 
 
  Dependent Variable: pRank(ImpKURT) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
MNGFORECAST_Q 0.038 (0.08      ) -0.266 (0.49      ) 0.631 (1.28      ) 0.169 (0.30      ) 
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER1 1.337 (4.49 ***) 
      
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER2   
 
1.235 (4.20 ***) 
    
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER1 > 0   
   
1.129 (2.41 ***) 
  
MNGFORECAST_Q x HIGH_UNCER2 > 0   
     
1.445 (2.71 ***) 
 
  
       
Controls (per Table 3) Included Included Included Included 
Macro Controls (per Table 7) Included Included Included Included 
 
  
       
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 
 
 
This table presents the variance risk premium for stocks over the earnings announcement period and the option-
implied kurtosis.  N = 56,299 for each regression.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is VRP_30, the difference 
between the 30-day implied daily variance minus the subsequent realized daily variance for 30 calendar days.  The 
implied model-free variances are measured (–5, –3) trading days before the earnings announcement date (see 
Appendix 2).  The realized variance is measured over the 30 calendar day horizon starting on day –2 preceding the 
earnings announcement date for quarter t.  The variance risk premium is the daily implied variance minus the 
subsequent realized variance.  In Panel B, the dependent variables is ImpKURT, defined as the average implied 
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kurtosis values, measured over trading days (–5, –3) preceding the earnings announcement date; pRank denotes the 
percentile rank, with ranks are calculated within quarter.   
MNGFORECAST_Q is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues a quarterly forecast during the look-back 
window of –5 trading days prior to the last earnings announcement to –6 trading days before the earnings 
announcement date.  HIGH_UNCER1 is a variable defined a [0, 3] scale; it is the sum of indicator variables 
denoting sporadic quarterly guiding firms, negative surprise quarterly forecasts, and quarterly forecasts issued less 
than or equal to 45 days before the earnings announcement date.  HIGH_UNCER2 is a variable defined a [0, 3] 
scale; it is the sum of indicator variables denoting sporadic quarterly guiding firms, negative or positive surprise 
quarterly forecasts, and quarterly forecast provide less than or equal to 45 days before the earnings announcement 
date.   
 
The control variables (following Table 3) include the following: LOG_VIX, FIRM_AGE, ROE, LOSS, SIZE, LEV, 
LOG_BTM, LOG_FOLL and LOG_HISTVOL.  The macro controls variables (following Table 7) further include 
ImpSPXSKEW and ImpSPXKURT, which are the implied skewness and kurtosis values for the SPX.  See Appendix 
1 for variable definitions and see Appendix 2 for details on the implied skewness and kurtosis calculations.  
  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile and all continuous independent variables are 
standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting announcement date and all standard errors are clustered by 
firm.  ***, ** and * denote variables that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, two-sided respectively.  All 
coefficients in Panel A are multiplied by 10,000 and all coefficients in Panel B are multiplied by 100.
  
78
TABLE 10. Forecast Type and the Variance Risk Premium and Implied Kurtosis 
 
Full Sample Quarterly Forecast Sample 
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
  VRP_30 pRank(ImpKURT) VRP_30 pRank(ImpKURT) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RANGE FORECAST 0.901 (5.25***) 1.434 (3.47***) 0.790 (4.83***) 1.440 (3.44***) 
POINT FORECAST 0.722 (2.78***) 1.493 (2.60***) 0.705 (2.83***) 1.529 (2.64***) 
OTHER FORECAST 1.258 (3.29***) 0.681 (0.84     ) 1.205 (3.28***) 0.486 (0.60     ) 
        
F-Tests         
 (RANGE FORECAST = POINT FORECAST) 0.456 0.010 0.111 0.021 
 (RANGE FORECAST = OTHER FORECAST) 0.794 0.786 1.165 1.252 
 (POINT FORECAST = OTHER FORECAST) 1.467 0.764 1.378 1.250 
        
Controls (per Table 3) Included Included Included Included 
Macro Controls (per Table 7) Not Included Included Not Included Included 
        
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter 
Adj. R2 16.0% 15.1% 12.2% 13.0% 
N 81,824 81,824 56,299 56,299 
 
This table presents the variance risk premium for stocks over the earnings announcement period and the option-
implied kurtosis.  The first dependent variable is VRP_30, the difference between the 30-day implied daily variance 
minus the subsequent realized daily variance for 30 calendar days.  The implied model-free variances are 
measured (–5, –3) trading days before the earnings announcement date (see Appendix 2).  The realized variance is 
measured over the 30 calendar day horizon starting on day –2 preceding the earnings announcement date for 
quarter t.  The variance risk premium is the daily implied variance minus the subsequent realized variance.  T 
other dependent variable is ImpKURT, defined as the average implied kurtosis values, measured over trading days 
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(–5, –3) preceding the earnings announcement date; pRank denotes the percentile rank, with ranks are calculated 
within quarter.   
A RANGE forecast is a quarterly forecast having an upper and lower bound (code ‘B’, ‘G’, or ‘H’); a POINT forecast 
is a quarterly forecast having a specific forecasted value (code ‘A’, ‘F’, or ‘Z’); and OTHER forecasts includes all 
other quarterly forecast categories.   
 
The control variables (following Table 3) include the following: LOG_VIX, FIRM_AGE, ROE, LOSS, SIZE, LEV, 
LOG_BTM, LOG_FOLL and LOG_HISTVOL.  The macro controls variables (following Table 7) further include 
ImpSPXSKEW and ImpSPXKURT, which are the implied skewness and kurtosis values for the SPX.  See Appendix 
1 for variable definitions and see Appendix 2 for details on the implied skewness and kurtosis calculations.  
  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile and all continuous independent variables are 
standardized.  Quarters are based on the reporting announcement date and all standard errors are clustered by 
firm.  ***, ** and * denote variables that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, two-sided respectively.  All 
coefficients when using VRP_30 as the dependent variable are multiplied by 10,000 and all coefficients when using 
ImpKURT as the dependent variable are multiplied by 100. 
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